Russia and the question of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. What strait connects the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea

STRAITS, BOSPORUS AND DARDANELLES. Usually called (together with the Sea of ​​Marmara located between them) the “Black Sea straits” or simply “straits”, they are the only route of communication between the Black and Mediterranean seas; “The question of the straits” is one of the oldest problems in international relations, which remains relevant to this day.

The political content of this problem for the Black Sea powers essentially boils down to providing them with a reliable connection with the Mediterranean Sea and at the same time completely protecting the security of the Black Sea. Non-Black Sea powers view the problem of the straits from an opposite angle, seeking wide access for their armed forces to the Black Sea and at the same time preventing the military fleets of the Black Sea countries from entering the Mediterranean Sea. The severity of the problem of the straits stems from the paramount strategic and economic importance of the straits, due to their geographical and historical features. Firstly, the straits are very narrow (in the Bosporus the narrowest point is about 600 m, in the Dardanelles - about 1300 m); therefore, it is easy to “lock” them, that is, not to allow ships to pass through the straits, or, having let some ships through, not to let others through. Secondly, both banks of the straits belong to the same state - Turkey. Thirdly, and this is the most important feature of the straits, they connect the open sea (Mediterranean) with the closed sea (Black), from which there is no other exit except the straits; Thus, the navigation regime in the straits affects the vital interests of all the Black Sea powers, and not just Turkey, because it automatically predetermines the order of ships’ entry into and exit from the Black Sea.

Complications in the issue of the straits arose whenever attempts were made to ignore the interests of the Black Sea countries and make them and the security of the Black Sea dependent on the unilateral actions of the power that owns the shores of the straits. Such attempts became less and less successful as the largest Black Sea state, Russia, developed economically and politically. They only emphasized the sharp contradiction between the growth in volume and significance of Russian interests in the Black Sea, on the one hand, and the parallel process of decline and weakening of the Ottoman Empire, on the other. The situation worsened when the Sultan's Turkey, having lost first its foreign policy and then its domestic political independence, turned into a semi-colony of capitalist powers. From that time on, the role of the Porte in the issue of the straits decreased to such an extent that practically the establishment of the regime of the straits passed entirely to the European “great powers”, of which only Russia was a Black Sea country. The Western powers, and above all England, which laid claim to global maritime dominance, made the issue of the straits an instrument of their anti-Russian policy, seeking to limit the freedom of Russian navigation in the straits and at the same time gain wide access to the Black Sea in order to keep the Black Sea coast of Russia under constant military threat. England's expansionist plans also included the seizure of the straits zone and some other areas of the Ottoman Empire, intended by the British as their share of the “Ottoman inheritance.” In turn, the ruling circles of Tsarist Russia subordinated the issue of the straits to the desire to annex Constantinople and the straits, seeing this as the only way to resolve the problem.

For all these reasons, the question of the straits, like the more general eastern question (the division of the Ottoman Empire, especially its European possessions), became hopelessly confused. Back in the middle of the 19th century. Marx noted that the diplomacy of the capitalist powers would not be able to satisfactorily resolve the Eastern question. “The solution to the Turkish problem, like many others,” Marx wrote, “will fall to the lot of the European revolution... Since 1789, the revolution has covered an increasingly vast area, its borders are expanding further. Its last border pillars were Warsaw, Debrecin, Bucharest , the extreme limits of the coming revolution should be St. Petersburg and Constantinople." Indeed, after the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Eastern Question was eliminated as a problem of dividing the “Ottoman inheritance.” However, the issue of the straits remained unresolved. Its settlement was prevented by the imperialist powers led by England, who used it in their struggle against Soviet Russia. At one time it seemed that Kemalist Turkey, which had successfully repelled the imperialist intervention with the support of Soviet Russia, would help achieve an agreement on the straits acceptable to the Black Sea countries. However, the low level of socio-economic development of Turkey and the weakness of the Turkish proletariat predetermined the apex and half-hearted nature of the Turkish bourgeois-national revolution. As J.V. Stalin points out, this revolution “is the top revolution of the national commercial bourgeoisie, which arose in the struggle against foreign imperialists and in its further development was directed, in fact, against the peasants and workers, against the very possibilities of the agrarian revolution.”

Although bourgeois Turkey differed in many ways from the feudal-clerical Ottoman Empire, it did not become a democratic country. The openly reactionary regime that has established itself in Turkey has made Turkey directly dependent on imperialism. During the Second World War, Turkey came to the shame of collaborating with the fascist aggressors, and after the war it found itself directly subordinate to the Anglo-American imperialists.

As a result, the issue of the straits, even in modern times, has not received a satisfactory resolution, continuing to burden Soviet-Turkish relations and preventing the stabilization of peace in the Middle East.

The history of the struggle for the straits goes back many centuries. Even the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) made navigation in the straits and the Black Sea dependent on its discretion. The conquest of Constantinople (1453) and then the entire Black Sea coast by the Turks subjected the passage of ships through the straits to the tyranny of the Turkish authorities. The obstacles posed by the Turks to both communication between the Mediterranean and Black Seas, and especially trade between Europe and Asia, prompted Western European countries to search for new routes to the East, and the great geographical discovery of the late 15th century - the establishment of a sea route around the Cape of Good Hope - was a kind of bypassing the flank of the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte from time to time allowed foreign ships through the straits and issued firmans to one state or another for the right to trade with the Black Sea regions (in the 17th century the Dutch and the British enjoyed this right). But these firmans could be annulled at any time, and they were indeed annulled by the Porte if it found it advantageous. The friction that occurred on this basis led a number of powers to conflicts with Turkey, which sometimes became very acute. Nevertheless, the question of the straits did not yet have the significance of an international problem in the modern sense of the term. On the shores of the Black Sea there was no other power except Turkey, and the path through the straits led only to Turkish, and not to anyone else’s, possessions, that is, to the internal Turkish sea. In view of this, the issue of the straits, which was within the competence of the Black Sea countries and only the Black Sea countries, should then have been considered an internal matter of the only Black Sea power at that time - Turkey.

The situation changed radically in the second half of the 17th century, when Russia began to return to its ancestral lands on the shores of the Azov and Black Seas, from which it had been pushed back in previous centuries. In 1696, Peter I took Azov and in the same year issued a decree on the construction of the Russian fleet, putting on the agenda the issue of sailing Russian ships in the Black Sea and the straits. From that time on, the issue of the straits went beyond the scope of domestic Turkish politics and, since a second power besides Turkey appeared on the Black Sea - Russia, it acquired an international character.

From this point of view, the history of the issue of the straits as an international problem begins at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries. The following three periods can be distinguished in it: 1) from the end of the 17th century, when Russia first put forward a demand for the opening of the straits for Russian ships, and until the 40s of the 19th century, when international regulation of the regime of the straits was established; 2) from the 40s of the 19th century until the end of the First World War - a period during which the issue of the straits, being part of the eastern question, was entirely subordinated to the imperialist interests of the “great powers”, and the regime of the straits was regulated by multilateral agreements; 3) since the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia - a period not yet completed, during which the Soviet government has steadily sought and is seeking a fair solution to the issue of the straits through an agreement between the Black Sea countries on the basis of equality and with full provision for their interests and the security of the Black Sea.

In the first period The issue of the straits was resolved primarily by bilateral Russian-Turkish agreements without the participation of non-Black Sea powers. Russia had to make great efforts and spend many decades in order to break the resistance of Turkey and achieve the opening of the Black Sea and the straits, first for trade and then for its military ships.

In 1698, Prokofy Voznitsyn (...) tried to negotiate this matter with Turkish representatives at the Karlowitz Congress (...), but received a categorical refusal. His attempt was continued by Emelyan Ukraintsev (see) at the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Constantinople in 1700 (...). Using the support of powers hostile to Russia, the Porte continued to persist. At the conclusion of the Belgrade Peace Treaties of 1739 (...) she again managed, with the help of the French ambassador Villeneuve, who acted as a mediator, to reject Russian demands for the opening of the Black Sea to Russian shipping. Only the decisive success of Russia in the war of 1768-1774 forced Turkey to recognize the long-accomplished fact of transforming the Black Sea from an internal Turkish sea into a Russian-Turkish sea and agree to the opening of both the Black Sea and the straits for Russian merchant shipping (see Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty 1774).

Having received the right of passage through the straits and navigation in the Black Sea for its own merchant ships under the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Treaty, Russia subsequently achieved the same right for merchant ships of other states. This was reflected in a number of Russian-Turkish treaties and agreements, and the Porte at that time unequivocally recognized that Russia has the right to control Turkey’s fulfillment of its obligation to freely pass merchant ships through the straits. The most significant in this regard was the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 (...). Imposing on Turkey the obligation not to interfere with the passage through the straits of Russian merchant ships, as well as merchant ships of other states, “with which the Ottoman Empire is not in a declared war,” the agreement further read: “...And if (from what God forbid) what - if one of the provisions contained in this article is violated and the Russian minister’s opinion about this is not met with complete and speedy satisfaction, then the Sublime Porte first recognizes that the imperial Russian court has the right to accept such a violation as a hostile action and immediately act in relation to the Ottoman Empire by the right of retribution."

The Kuchuk-Kainardzhi and Adrianople treaties finally resolved one part of the problem of the straits - their opening for merchant shipping of all countries. Difficulties in this matter continued in the future: the Turkish authorities violated freedom of passage, imposed excessive fees on transit ships, created nitpicking in the field of sanitary control, etc. However, the very principle of freedom of merchant shipping in the straits was firmly established, and no one challenged it. .

A much more difficult matter was resolving the issue of the passage of warships through the straits. Here Russia had to worry not only about opening the straits for Russian warships, but also about ensuring the security of the Black Sea from possible aggression from non-Black Sea powers, and therefore, ensuring that foreign warships did not penetrate the Black Sea.

The view of Russian diplomacy on the Black Sea, as closed to the military fleets of non-Black Sea powers, was clearly formulated by A. R. Vorontsov at the very beginning of his chancellorship, in 1802. Suggesting that the Russian ambassador in Constantinople A. Ya. Italisky insist on the Porte’s rejection of Talleyrand’s demand for the admission of French warships to the Black Sea “to protect trade from corsairs” (who, by the way, have never been in this sea), Vorontsov pointed out: “ The Black Sea should not be considered otherwise as a lake or a locked sea, into which there is no other way to enter than through a canal (i.e. straits - Ed.), and the possession of which belongs only to those powers whose shores surround it."

At that time, Turkey also recognized the need, by opening the straits for Russian warships, to prevent the passage of warships of other powers. Russia received the right to conduct its warships through the straits under the Russian-Turkish alliance treaty of 1799 (...). This right was confirmed by Art. 4 of the Russian-Turkish Union Treaty of 1805 (...), which also included the following important resolution, which approved the principle of closing the Black Sea to warships of non-Black Sea countries: “The contracting parties agreed to consider the Black Sea closed and not to allow any military personnel to appear there ship or armed vessel of any (third - Ed.) power; in the event that any of these powers attempts to come there with armed forces, the high contracting parties undertake to consider such an attempt as a pretext for war and to oppose it with all their naval forces, recognizing this as the only means to ensure their mutual security" (Article 7, secret). Essentially, this resolution meant that Russia and Turkey agreed in principle on the joint Russian-Turkish defense of the Black Sea against invasion by the naval forces of non-Black Sea countries through the straits.

The regime of the straits, determined by bilateral Russian-Turkish treaties, generally met the interests of both Black Sea powers - Russia and Turkey, but speaking of the fact that the very alliance with Russia protected Turkey from external, and to a large extent, from internal shocks. But Turkey's foreign policy was no longer independent. Subjected to the influence of one power or another, the Porte gradually turned into a weak-willed instrument of the international political game. The efforts of Napoleon's ambassador, Gen. Sebastiani led in 1806 to Turkey's violation of the treaty of alliance and other agreements with Russia, which resulted in a six-year Russian-Turkish war (see Treaty of Bucharest of 1812). At the same time, England, then an ally of Russia, tried to take advantage of the opportunity to resolve the issue of the straits in its favor. The breakthrough of Admiral Deckworth's squadron through the Dardanelles in 1807 ended in a disastrous retreat, but the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 1809 (...) brought England a tangible advantage, introducing it to the regulation of the regime of the straits and fixing for the first time the "ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire" on the prohibition of admission to the straits warships of any foreign power, not excluding Russia.

This so-called Treaty of Dardanelles of 1809 was the first agreement on the issue of the passage of warships through the straits concluded by Turkey with a non-Black Sea power. Its significance was initially small, and the “ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire” did not prevent Turkey from negotiating the regime of the straits directly with Russia for another quarter of a century. The most important among the bilateral Russian-Turkish agreements of this period was Unkyar-Iskelesi Treaty of 1833(...), according to which Turkey undertook, at the request of Russia, to close the Dardanelles to the passage of foreign warships. It caused an uproar among Russia's rivals. England and France sent notes of protest to the Russian government, in which they threatened that they would consider the Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty “as if non-existent.” In a response note, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected the protest, indicating that it would consider the English and French notes “as if non-existent.” An attempt to intimidate Russia and Turkey by sending an Anglo-French squadron to the straits was also unsuccessful.

However, the Unkyar-Iskelesi Treaty turned out to be short-lived. Nicholas I considered the most important task of his foreign policy to be the fight against the “revolutionary infection” in Europe and, above all, against the hated “king of the barricades” Louis Philippe. Subordinating all other Russian foreign policy interests to this main goal, he was ready to make concessions on various other issues, including on the issue of Turkey and the Straits, just to isolate France and form a pan-European bloc against it. Already in the fall of 1833, the Austro-Russian Munich Convention (q.v.) was signed, limiting Russia’s freedom of action in the Middle East, and in 1839, Nicholas I finally renounced the benefits of the Unkar-Iskeles Treaty in order to, at this price, obtain England’s consent to a joint action of the powers against Egyptian Pasha Muhammad Ali (q.v.) and France behind him. Concluded on this basis London Convention of 1840(...) was indeed anti-French in nature, but at the same time it revived the “ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire”, which was so convenient for the British, which blocked the path for Russian warships through the straits. Nicholas I was confident that the London Convention of 1840 was a great success of his diplomacy, but in fact it was Palmerston who won, who had long said that he would like to “dissolve” the Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty in “an agreement of a more general nature.”

With the termination of the Unkar-Iskeles Treaty, the period of bilateral Russian-Turkish agreements on the regime of the straits ended.

Second period in the history of the issue of the straits opened with the signing of the London Convention of 1841 between the “great powers” ​​(including this time France) and Turkey. It confirmed the “ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire” prohibiting the passage of any foreign warships through the straits, which from now on became a norm of international law. The Sultan announced that he “has a firm intention for the future” to observe this “immutably established principle,” and the remaining participants in the convention promised to “respect this decision of the Sultan and be consistent with the above-stated principle” (Article I).

The multilateral regulation of the regime of the straits established by the London Convention of 1841 deprived both Black Sea powers, i.e., both Turkey and Russia, of their rights. Turkey now could not, even if it wanted to, break its “ancient rule” in favor of Russia. The Russian navy found itself locked in the Black Sea. The ban on foreign warships entering the Black Sea was of dubious value for Russia, since it was intended only for peacetime, and since Turkey, with the signing of the London Conventions of 1840 and 1841, actually (and partly formally) came under the tutelage of European powers, among which England then enjoyed the greatest influence on the Porto.

For his part, Nicholas I headed for the division of the Ottoman Empire. The issue of the straits was, although not the only one, one of the most important motives that pushed the tsarist government to war with Turkey. The Russian people had to pay with blood and hardships for the reactionary policies and incompetent diplomacy of tsarism. The Paris Congress of 1856 (...) imposed heavy obligations on Russia, among which the most painful and humiliating was the resolution on the so-called “neutralization” of the Black Sea (Articles 11, 13 and 14), which prohibited Russia from taking any measures to protect its Black Sea coast. The regime of the straits itself remained the same. The Straits Convention attached to the Treaty of Paris reproduced the London Convention of 1841 with only minor changes. But now, combined with the “neutralization” of the Black Sea, the closure of the straits to Russian warships posed an even greater threat to Russia’s security than before, preventing the Russian government from transferring ships from other seas to the Black Sea, while Western powers hostile to Russia could at any moment to force Turkey, subordinate to them, to violate the convention on the straits in their favor.

In 1870, the Russian government canceled the articles of the Paris Treaty on the “neutralization” of the Black Sea (see Gorchakov’s circulars). England was forced to retreat on this issue, and the London Convention of 1871 authorized the restoration of Russia's sovereign rights. However, the regime of the straits was defined in this convention (Articles 2 and 3) on almost the same basis as in 1841: the straits were still considered closed in peacetime to the passage of all foreign warships, including Russians . This system was also preserved by the Berlin Treaty of 1878 (Article 63).

Until the First World War, Russian diplomacy tried in vain to change this unfavorable situation for Russia. There were cases, for example, in 1891 and 1894, when the Sultan issued firmans for the passage of Russian warships through the straits (without weapons and without armed guards), but England made it difficult to obtain such permission, and in 1904 even staged a naval demonstration near the straits to prevent the passage of Russian military ships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. As a result, during the Russo-Japanese War, one of the best Russian squadrons was locked in the Black Sea by international treaties under the control of Japan's ally, England. Equally unsuccessful, mainly due to the opposition of England, were further attempts by Russia to resolve the issue of the straits peacefully: negotiations by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs A.P. Izvolsky during the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 (...) and the so-called “démarche Charykov" in 1911, undertaken in connection with the Italo-Turkish war. To the representations of the Russian government, British diplomacy invariably responded that it considered the moment to raise the issue of the straits “inconvenient,” or proposed, as an alternative to the principle of closing the straits to all foreign warships, their complete opening, but also for all powers without exception, which brought Russia would not see an improvement, but a sharp deterioration in the regime of the Straits.

International trusteeship over the straits was also disadvantageous for Turkey, violating its sovereignty and creating a dangerous aggravation of relations with Russia. But Turkey's role in resolving the issue of the straits was insignificant and pathetic. French journalist Rene Pinon wrote about this: “Entrusting the key to a house where a healthy soldier is locked up to an old disabled person means putting the guard in front of the worst misadventures or the need to call for help; there will be many who want to help, but no one will want to do it for free "Thus, you don’t know who to feel sorry for: Russia, locked in the Black Sea, or Turkey, which prohibits exit from it."

In the years immediately preceding the First World War, German influence over Turkey increased sharply. The military mission of Liman von Sanders (...) arrived in Constantinople at the end of 1913 and established its control over the Turkish army. A number of other signs also indicated that Turkey, and consequently the straits, were coming under German domination. Meanwhile, England, which still had (together with France) important financial, economic and diplomatic leverage over the Turkish government, practically did not prevent German penetration into Turkey. The reason for this “non-interference” was the desire of British diplomacy to replace Anglo-Russian antagonism on the issue of the Straits with German-Russian one and thereby strengthen the dependence of Tsarist Russia on England. The same reason was responsible for the connivance of the English Mediterranean squadron towards the German warships Goebenu and Breslau, which allowed them to penetrate the straits at the beginning of August 1914; This also explained all the subsequent behavior of British diplomacy, which made it easier for the Germans and Enver Pasha (see) to involve Turkey in the First World War on the side of Germany (see German-Turkish Treaty of 1914). When Turkey's participation in the war became a fact, the British were the first to begin making promising hints to the tsarist government that Turkey “can no longer be the guardian of the straits.” As a result of the subsequent negotiations, the Anglo-Franco-Russian secret agreement of 1915 was signed (...) on the inclusion of Constantinople and the straits, after the Allied victory over Germany, into the Russian Empire. From the point of view of England and France, this agreement was intended to preserve and strengthen the interest of the ruling circles of Russia in bringing the war with Germany to a victorious end. The tsarist government also tried to use this agreement to fight against the growing anti-war sentiment in Russia and for this purpose announced its main contents in the Duma in 1916.

The real value of this agreement for Russia was problematic: the allies accompanied it with such reservations that it would be relatively easy for them to evade their promise to Russia at the end of the war. In addition, immediately after the signing of the agreement, England, on the initiative of Churchill (...) jointly with France undertook the so-called Dardanelles expedition with the aim of capturing the straits and keeping them in their hands. Even S. D. Sazonov (...), who fully defended the imperialist alliance of Russia with England and France, admitted in his “Memoirs” that when the English and French ambassadors informed him about the decision of their governments to undertake the Dardanelles expedition, it “cost him some work hide the unpleasant impression from them,” and he said to them: “Remember that you are not undertaking this expedition at my request.”

Third period In the history of the issue of the straits, the Great October Socialist Revolution opened up. This new stage differs sharply from the two previous ones, primarily in that with the emergence of the world's first socialist state, the nature of the foreign policy of the largest of the Black Sea powers, Soviet Russia, radically changed. Guided by Lenin and Stalin, the foreign policy of Soviet Russia set itself tasks that meet not only the national interests of the Soviet country, but also the fundamental interests of the masses of the whole world (...). Therefore, the question of the straits acquired new significance. Having rejected the aggressive plans of tsarism, Soviet diplomacy, at the same time, defends the interests of the Black Sea countries and the principle of security of the Black Sea with much greater firmness and persistence. But the policy of the imperialist powers is still aimed at using the straits to carry out their aggressive plans.

In the first time after the end of the war of 1914-1918, England showed the greatest activity on the issue of the straits. At the beginning of November 1918, immediately after the signing of the Armistice of Mudros (...), the English navy entered the Dardanelles and threatened Constantinople with its guns. In 1920, Constantinople was already formally occupied by the Entente powers led by England. Taking advantage of its power over Poland, the Entente carried out an armed intervention against Soviet Russia. England, through the Greek army, also intervened against Kemalist Turkey. Under pressure from the British, the powerless Sultan's government signed the Sèvres Peace Treaty of 1920 with the Entente (...), dooming Turkey to dismemberment and enslavement. The issue of the straits was resolved by the Treaty of Sèvres exclusively in favor of England: the straits were disarmed and opened to warships of all powers; the straits zone was transferred to the authority of an international commission headed by representatives of the Entente; this commission received the right to maintain its own troops, police in the straits, have its own flag and budget. All this should have led to the transition of the straits to the actual dominance of England, as the strongest naval power.

England's hopes for the victory of the anti-Soviet intervention did not come true. And in Turkey, the British encountered an obstacle that was unexpected for them - the Turkish national liberation movement, which received support from Soviet Russia. The Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921 between the RSFSR and Turkey (see Soviet-Turkish Treaties) was of decisive importance for the Turks in their struggle for independence. He laid the foundation for Soviet-Turkish friendship, which allowed the Turks to repel the onslaught of interventionists and achieve the abolition of the Treaty of Sèvres.

The Moscow Treaty of 1921 also contained a resolution on the issue of the straits. It read: “In order to ensure the opening of the straits and free passage through them for trade relations of all peoples, both contracting parties agree to transfer the final development of the international statute of the Black Sea and the straits to a special conference of delegates from the coastal countries, provided that its decisions do not prejudice the full the sovereignty of Turkey, as well as the security of Turkey and its capital, Constantinople" (Article V). Identical articles were included in the Kars Treaty of 1921 (Article 9) and in the Ukrainian-Turkish Treaty of 1922 (Article 4).

However, at the Lausanne Conference (...) the issue of the straits was not considered only by the Black Sea countries. The leadership of the conference was seized by the Entente powers led by England. The chairman of the commission discussing the issue of the straits was Lord Curzon (...); Even Japan, which had nothing to do with the issue of the straits, took part in it. The only delegation that consistently and to the end defended the interests of the Black Sea countries was the Soviet delegation. Turkey, although it came to the Lausanne Conference as a winner, showed hasty and far-reaching compliance with the British on the issue of the straits, hoping to receive support from England on other issues of the peace treaty. The pliability of the Turks made it easier for Curzon to complete his task. Ignoring the fair demands of the Soviet delegation and relying on his allies and satellites, he entered into a behind-the-scenes conspiracy with the Turkish delegation led by Ismet Inonu (...), and carried out his draft convention on the straits.

The Lausanne Convention, signed on July 24, 1923, established a regime for the straits that differed only slightly from that adopted in Sèvres. The straits were disarmed and declared open for the passage of any warship, “whatever the flag,” day and night, without any permission or even warning from the Turkish authorities. Only the commission created by the Lausanne Convention to monitor the implementation of the rules for the passage of warships through the straits did not have the rights that were provided for by the Treaty of Sèvres, and its chairman should not have been a representative of the Entente powers, but a representative of Turkey; In addition, the Lausanne Convention contained some, essentially insignificant, restrictions on the entry of foreign warships into the Black Sea.

This regime of the straits put the Black Sea at risk of aggression. Therefore, the Soviet Union did not ratify the Lausanne Convention. This regime of the straits was also dangerous for Turkey, but the Turkish government signed and approved the convention to the detriment of the interests of its country.

It soon became clear to the Turks themselves what a threat the Lausanne Convention on the Straits posed to them. Since 1933, when the German fascists, having seized power in Germany, created a hotbed of war in Europe, and the Italian fascists, intensively arming the Dodecanese islands located near Asia Minor, plunged the Turks into almost panic, Turkish diplomacy began to probe the waters about the possibility of remilitarizing the straits . For some time, this sounding was met with stubborn opposition from the British, who stated that they considered the moment to revise the Lausanne Convention “inappropriate.” But at the end of 1935, in connection with the Italo-Ethiopian war and the implementation of some economic sanctions against Italy by the League of Nations, England itself showed interest in rapprochement with Turkey in order to use its naval bases. British diplomacy involved Turkey in the Mediterranean "gentlemen's" agreement on mutual assistance and made it clear to the Turkish government that, on the basis of Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, Turkey could achieve a change in the regime of the straits.

In June 1936, an international conference on the issue of the straits opened in Montreux (see Montreux conference). At it, the Turkish delegation, just as it was in Lausanne, but in an even more dangerous form for the interests of the Black Sea countries, retreated from the principles of security of the Black Sea and friendship with the USSR. A behind-the-scenes conspiracy took place between the Turkish and British delegations, aimed at disrupting Soviet proposals regarding the right of the Black Sea countries to conduct their warships through the straits. Ultimately, the Turks and British, due to the decisive resistance of the USSR, had to abandon most of their objections, and the new convention on the regime of the straits, signed on 20.7.1936, reflected many of the demands put forward by the Soviet Union. It recognized the special position of the Black Sea states compared to non-Black Sea states; the admission of warships of non-Black Sea powers into the straits was limited (by tonnage, class and duration of stay in the Black Sea), and the Black Sea countries were allowed to conduct any of their ships through the straits; The passage of warships of warring powers through the straits was completely prohibited. But this convention did not fully ensure the interests of the Black Sea countries. Its main drawback, from the point of view of the security of the Black Sea, was that Turkey could virtually uncontrollably interpret and apply the convention at its sole discretion.

Such broad and exclusive rights of Turkey were all the more dangerous because its military-technical resources and other objective capabilities did not correspond to the tasks of defending the straits in a modern war, and its growing dependence on imperialist, including fascist, powers cast doubt on its resolve the Turkish government to repel aggressors in the event of an attack on the security of the straits and the Black Sea.

The unsuitability of the Montreux Convention was clearly demonstrated during the Second World War. Turkey provided all possible assistance to the fascist aggressors (see German-Turkish Treaty of 1941). Her diplomacy (see “Sarajoglu and Menemencioglu”) led an openly hostile line against the USSR. In particular, this was reflected in the use of the straits by the fascist powers to the detriment of the Soviet Union. Thus, on July 9, 1941, the German command led the German patrol ship Seefalke through the straits into the Black Sea, which was a gross violation of the convention on the straits and caused a representation from the USSR to the Turkish government. In August 1941, the Turkish authorities gave permission to the Italian auxiliary vessel Tarvisio to pass through the straits into the Black Sea, in connection with which the Soviet government also made a representation to Turkey. 4. XI 1942 The Soviet government again drew the attention of the Turkish government to the fact that Germany intends to conduct through the straits, under the guise of merchant ships, auxiliary military ships with a total displacement of 140 thousand tons, intended for the transfer of military forces and military materials of the Axis countries to the Black Sea, and that the passage of these vessels would be a clear violation of the convention signed at Montreux. In June 1944, the Soviet government protested to the Turkish government against the passage of German military and military auxiliary vessels of various tonnage through the straits from the Black Sea to the Aegean at the end of May and beginning of June 1944, such as the Ems (8 ships) and the Kriegstransport. "(5 vessels) participating in naval operations in the Black Sea. In addition, the Turkish authorities repeatedly allowed German high-speed barges to pass through the straits in 1942-1943. The magnitude of the threat created for the security of the Black Sea was such that the Soviet Supreme High Command had to withdraw a significant number of armed forces from the main directions of the theater of operations for the defense of the Black Sea region.

In light of these circumstances, even England and the USA were forced to admit the unsatisfactory nature of the Montreux Convention. At the Potsdam Conference in 1945 (...) the governments of the USSR, England and the USA agreed that this convention should be revised as not meeting the conditions of the present time, and that as a next step this issue would be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three powers and by the Turkish government.

In accordance with the decision of the Potsdam Conference, the USSR government began negotiations with Turkey. By a note dated 7. VIII 1946, it proposed to the Turkish government to base the regime of the straits on the following five principles: 1) the straits should always be open for the passage of merchant ships of all countries; 2) the straits must always be open for the passage of military ships of the Black Sea powers; 3) passage through the straits for military vessels of non-Black Sea powers is not allowed, except for specially provided cases; 4) the establishment of the regime of the straits as the only sea route leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea should be the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers; 5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of ensuring freedom of merchant shipping and security in the straits, organize jointly the defense of the straits to prevent the use of the straits by other states for purposes hostile to the Black Sea powers.

The Soviet proposals, fully justified by the lessons of the entire long history of the issue of the straits, were, however, not accepted by Turkey. 24. IX 1946 The Soviet government sent a new note to the Turkish government on this issue, in which it subjected the arguments of the Turkish government to a detailed analysis and proved their inconsistency. But this time too, the Turkish government, under the influence of Anglo-American imperialist circles hostile to the Soviet Union, refused to contribute to a fair resolution of the issue of the straits.

Thus, the issue of the straits, having gone through various historical phases and largely changed its form, and partly its content, still remains unsettled at the present time. It goes without saying that it cannot be considered in isolation from other problems of international politics. The attitude of a particular power to the issue of the straits, both in the past and now, depends on the general direction and nature of the policy of that power. The imperialist powers are pursuing imperialist goals in the issue of the straits. Turkey, which has submitted to Anglo-American imperialism, also acts as an accomplice of the imperialists on the issue of the straits. On the contrary, the only socialist great power in the world - the Soviet Union - is seeking a solution to this centuries-old, but still urgent problem that would be consistent with the interests of peace and security of peoples.

Diplomatic Dictionary. Ch. ed. A. Ya. Vyshinsky and S. A. Lozovsky. M., 1948.

Since ancient times, the Black Sea straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles have been of great strategic importance, connecting the Black and Mediterranean Seas, Asia and Europe. Trade routes from Central Asia and India converged on the Black Sea coast. Whoever controlled the entrance to the Black Sea and the Black Sea straits received significant economic superiority.

Over time, the importance of the straits has not diminished at all. Despite the fact that planes and trains are currently used to transport goods, the sea route is still the cheapest and easiest way to deliver goods to distant countries.

The Bosphorus divides Istanbul into two parts, European and Asian, and is an integral symbol of the city. “Don’t say you live in Istanbul if you don’t see the Bosphorus every day,” say the Turks.

The name Bosphorus comes from the Greek language and means “bull ford”. It is difficult to imagine that in the times of Ancient Greece it was possible to ford the strait - the Bosphorus is famous for its dangerous currents and depth. Also, according to one of the ancient Greek myths, there were Symplegades - drifting rocks. Colliding, they destroyed all the ships trying to pass through the strait. Only Jason managed to do this, and after his feat the rocks froze in place and no longer posed a danger to sailors.

The Bosphorus Strait is Russia's shortest access to the Mediterranean Sea - for both commercial and military ships.

XVIII century

In the Middle Ages, the Russian state had no access to the seas and found itself aloof from major trade routes. With the beginning of the reign of Peter I, the question of gaining access to the Black Sea, expanding and protecting the southern borders arose in Russian politics.

Since the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, control of the Black Sea straits and trade with the Black Sea countries was in the hands of the Ottoman Empire. Gradually, the Turks more and more restricted the passage of merchant ships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. At the end of the 17th century, access to the Black Sea was open only to the British and Dutch.

After the annexation of Ukraine to Russia as a result of the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667, the entire left-bank Ukraine and the city of Kyiv went to Russia. Thus, the borders of the Russian state came close to the northern shores of the Black Sea.

In the 18th century, the Russian Empire's desire to expand its southern borders led to frequent clashes with the Ottoman Empire. Peter I set the task of achieving access to the sea and major trade routes. However, in the south, access to the sea was blocked by the Ottoman Empire.

After the capture of Azov in 1696, the Russians fortified themselves on the northern shore of the Sea of ​​Azov. The next task Peter I set was the capture of Kerch and the Kerch Strait. In 1699, Peter I sent the Russian ambassador Ukraintsev to Constantinople to negotiate Russian shipping in the Black Sea and access to the straits.

Negotiations lasted more than 10 months. The Turkish side did not want to give in to the Russian ambassador. In addition, the English and Dutch ambassadors did not want the Russian presence in the Black Sea, and plotted against the Russian ambassador.

Ukraintsev proposed adding to the peace treaty an article on mutual freedom of trade navigation between the Russian state and the Ottoman Empire: “To both countries, merchants with all sorts of goods... by the (Black) sea on ships and other (sea) vessels to the states of both great sovereigns, to the border and to the reigning cities and to the Crimea, it is free and safe to travel and go to trade and to stop at a shelter for water and bread and other living creatures without inspecting their goods and without any loss or aggravation and with good faith to have peaceful and unprincipled trade, and to pay the duty of both states to trading people according to the ancient custom both states where they will sell their goods.” The Turks were categorically not satisfied with this proposal; they proposed to trade only by dry route.

The negotiations ended with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Constantinople on July 3, 1700. Azov and Taganrog were ceded to Russia, Russia received the right to have an envoy in Constantinople on equal terms with envoys of other European states. However, the parties did not reach an agreement on the issue of Russian shipping in the Black Sea and the straits. During his entire reign, Peter I never achieved a solution to the Black Sea problem, and after the Prut campaign of 1711, Azov was again transferred to the Turks.

During the reign of Anna Ioannovna, a war broke out between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which lasted from 1735 to 1739. The Belgrade Peace Treaty, signed in 1739, did not make any changes to the regime of the Black Sea Straits. Moreover, Article 3 of the treatise prohibited maintaining the Russian fleet in the southern seas: “so that the Russian state could not have or build any naval fleet lower than other ships either in the Sea of ​​Azov or in the Black Sea.” At the same time, Russian trade in the Black Sea should be carried out only on Turkish ships.

Changes in the current situation in the Black Sea were achieved during the reign of Catherine the Great. As a result of the success of the Russian army on land and at sea during the Russian-Turkish War of 1768-1774. The Russian state managed to conclude a profitable peace with the Ottoman Empire. In July 1774, the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty was signed.

First of all, Russia and the Ottoman Empire recognized the independence of Crimea. Russia received eternal possession of part of the coast of the Azov and Black Seas, including Kerch and Azov.

Article 11 of the treaty allowed unhindered navigation of merchant ships of both powers “in all the seas washing their lands,” as well as free movement through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. At the same time, the agreement did not say anything about military courts. However, the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Treaty opened the Black Sea and the straits to the Russian state

19th century

In the 19th century, the weakening of the Ottoman Empire began, which for 400 years was considered one of the most powerful world powers. This led to the strengthening of European powers such as Great Britain and France, who sought to expand their borders to include colonies. In turn, Tsarist Russia sought to annex the territory of the Caucasus, which was controlled by the Ottoman Turks. The main task of Great Britain and France at that time was to prevent Russia from entering the Mediterranean Sea.

After Napoleon signed the Treaty of Tilsit with Russia in 1807, Great Britain concluded a treaty with the Ottoman Empire at Çanakkale on January 5, 1809. According to this treaty, military ships of all states were prohibited from entering the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Seeing the Russian Empire as an ally of Napoleon, Great Britain sought to prevent the appearance of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.

In 1826, the weakened Ottoman Empire, under threat of war with Russia, agreed to the signing of the Ackerman Convention (October 7, 1826). Turkey was forced to accept a number of demands from Tsarist Russia regarding the Balkan possessions, as well as to allow free passage of Russian merchant ships through the Black Sea straits. After 2 years, Türkiye entered the war with Russia and annulled the terms of the convention.

After defeat in the Russian-Turkish war in 1833, the Ottoman Empire signed the Unkar-Isklesi Treaty, which can safely be called a diplomatic victory for Russia. This treaty caused a storm of protest from England and France. They did not want to recognize the legal force of the treaty, calling it an attack on Turkish sovereignty. To a greater extent, discontent was caused by the fact that the treaty significantly strengthened Russia's position and made it difficult to attack Russia from the Black Sea.

The Unkyar-Iskelesi Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was concluded for a period of 8 years and contained an important secret article: “By virtue of one of the conditional clauses of Article 1 of the explicit allied defensive treaty concluded between the Russian Imperial Court and the Sublime Porte, both High Contracting Parties are obliged to submit mutually essential assistance and the most effective reinforcement for the security of their mutual Powers. However, since His Majesty the All-Russian Emperor, wishing to free the Sublime Ottoman Porte from the burden and inconvenience that would result from the delivery of significant assistance, will not require such assistance in the event that circumstances put the Sublime Porte under the obligation to provide it, then the Sublime Ottoman Porte , in return for the assistance that it is obliged to provide in case of need, by virtue of the rules of reciprocity of an explicit treaty, will have to limit its actions in favor of the Imperial Russian Court by closing the Dardanelles Strait, that is, not allowing any foreign warships to enter it under any circumstances pretext." Already in the same 1833, the ships of the Russian Baltic squadron passed through the straits into the Black Sea.

In the 40s XIX century The rivalry between the Catholic and Orthodox churches in Palestine intensified. In December, a government coup took place in France, bringing to power Charles Louis-Napoleon, the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte. The new emperor, proclaimed Napoleon III, from the very first days of his reign went into confrontation with Russia in the Middle East, with the active support of the Catholic Church. The actions of Napoleon III were supported by England.

At the beginning of 1853, the Russian ambassador Menshikov arrived to the Turkish Sultan Abdul-Mehad with a letter from Nicholas I. Russia proposed that the Sultan conclude a convention on the status of the Orthodox Church in Palestine and Syria, as well as a defensive treaty against France. The Sultan left the proposal unanswered, and in June 1853 Menshikov was forced to return to Russia with nothing.

Realizing that a break in relations with Turkey and a military conflict was almost inevitable, Nicholas I made plans to capture the Bosphorus. However, a number of ministers led by Nesselrode did not support the emperor’s plan, and as a result, Nicholas I signed on June 8, 1853 the Manifesto on the introduction of troops into the territory of the Danube principalities.

After occupying the Danube principalities on September 14, 1853, Nicholas I received an ultimatum from the Turkish Sultan demanding that the territory of the principalities be cleared within 15 days. A month later, the allied squadrons of England and France entered the Dardanelles. Russia was forced to leave the Danube principalities and begin hostilities in the Black Sea.

Crimean War 1853-56 ended in the defeat of Russia. On March 18, 1856, at an international congress in Paris, a peace treaty was signed with the participation of France, England, Russia, Austria, the Ottoman Empire, Sardinia and representatives of Prussia who later joined.

According to this treaty, in peacetime Turkey closed the Straits to all military vessels, regardless of flag. The Black Sea was declared neutral and open to merchant ships of all nations. Both Russia and Turkey were prohibited from having naval arsenals on the shores of the Black Sea, and the deployment of no more than 10 light military vessels for the coast guard was allowed. The Danube principalities remained vassals of Turkey. The Treaty of Paris significantly reduced the influence of the Russian Empire in Western and Central Europe.

The last one was in the 19th century. military clash between Turkey and Russia in 1877-1878. did not change the status of the Straits. The Treaty of San Stefano, signed as a result of Russia's victory, declared Serbia, Montenegro and Romania independent states. However, the subsequent Congress of Berlin, with the participation of major European powers, changed a number of articles of the Treaty of San Stefano, thus significantly reducing the significance of the Russian victory, in particular, reducing the territories of the Danube principalities that gained independence.
Balkan War 1912-1913

In the period 1907-1914. The problem of the Black Sea Straits occupied a special place in the foreign policy of the Russian Empire. The government's plans included not only solving the problem diplomatically, but even capturing the Bosporus.

However, after the Russian-Japanese War and the First Russian Revolution, the country's international position was greatly shaken. In 1907, Russia signed an agreement with England, where both sides made mutual concessions regarding Central Asia, Persia and Afghanistan.

Negotiations also took place between Russia and England to revise the regime of the Black Sea Straits. St. Petersburg sought to obtain Great Britain's consent to the passage of Russian military ships through the straits while closing them to the navy of non-Black Sea powers. England promised to help resolve the issue of the status of the straits, while making the revision of the convention dependent on the results of negotiations on the problems of the Middle East.

As a result of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, it was possible not only to stabilize the situation on the Central Asian borders, but also to strengthen Russia’s position in Europe.

In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Great Britain opposed it, fearing the strengthening of Germany's position in the Balkans. Russian diplomacy decided to take advantage of the current situation and revise the regime of the straits to the benefit of Russia.

Great Britain did not object to the opening of the straits, but not only for Russia, but for the equal use of them by all countries without exception. The demand for exclusive rights for Russia raised suspicions in London that the Russian Empire was trying to exploit the Bosnian crisis to the detriment of Turkey.

At the same time, Russia’s task was to prevent open military action in the Balkans, since the country was not ready for an armed conflict. As a result, Great Britain managed to defend its position regarding the Black Sea Straits. Russian diplomacy was forced to retreat.

In 1911, the Russian Empire decided to take advantage of the outbreak of Italian military action against Turkey and again try to open the straits to the Russian navy. The Russian ambassador in Constantinople, N. Charykov, hoped to obtain the consent of the European powers to discuss the issue of the straits between Russia and Turkey.

Great Britain counted on the fact that Germany and Austria-Hungary would object to the opening of the straits. However, Germany could not miss the opportunity to aggravate relations between Russia and England in the Middle East, and therefore expressed support for Russia.

Allies England and France did not approve of Charykov’s Russian-Turkish negotiations. At the same time, England still agreed to support the option of opening the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to all countries, and not just to Russia. However, unexpected German opposition forced England to reconsider its tactics.

Great Britain could not do without Russian support to resist Germany. Therefore, instead of openly refusing to revise the regime of the straits in favor of Russia, Great Britain was forced to hide behind diplomatic reasoning. As a result, Russian-Turkish negotiations on changing the regime of the straits failed.

Immediately after the end of the Italo-Turkish war, the situation in the region worsened. The performance of the Balkan Union against Turkey allowed the Russian government to think about landing Russian troops on the shores of the Bosphorus. However, the Black Sea Fleet did not have the necessary number of ships to simultaneously transport a 5,000-strong detachment to carry out the operation suddenly, and France and England strongly opposed this plan. Without their consent, the tsarist government did not dare to carry out this operation.

At the end of 1910, Sergei Dmitrievich Sazonov was appointed to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. If in the previous century the policy of St. Petersburg was aimed mainly at searching for bilateral agreements with Constantinople, now a multilateral approach was chosen. Like most of his predecessors, Sazonov believed that while Russia did not have sufficient power to dictate its will to the Ottoman Empire,

As a result of the Italian bombardment of the Dardanelles during the Italo-Turkish War in April 1912, the strait was closed and commercial shipping through the straits ceased. This affected the trade interests of many European powers, primarily Great Britain and the Russian Empire, and made the problem of the Black Sea Straits even more pressing.

The losses of the Russian economy were significant. Grain exports in the first half of 1912 decreased by 45% compared to the first half of 1911. In the period 1900-1909, from 1/3 to ½ of the exports of the Russian Empire, in particular coal, magnesium and oil from the Caucasus, were carried through the Black Sea straits and Ukraine.

The Italo-Turkish War sharply highlighted the vital importance of the Black Sea Straits for Russia, as well as the vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire for the Balkan states. This became the reason for the creation of an alliance of the Balkan states (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro) against the Ottoman Empire.

On October 8, 1912, Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire. In light of the new war, the Turks had to cede Tripoli and declare peace to Italy. Montenegro was joined by other Balkan states, inflicting a series of crushing defeats on the Ottoman Empire on the Balkan Peninsula. The reasons for the defeat of the Turks were both the internal problems of the country, which worsened after the Young Turk revolution in 1908, and the need to conduct military operations on several fronts at once.

At the beginning of November 1912, Bulgarian troops approached the outskirts of Constantinople. The Bulgarian offensive also alarmed Russia. Sazonov, who had previously advocated the Balkan Alliance, seeing it as an obstacle to Austro-Hungarian expansion, was concerned about Bulgaria's desire to capture Constantinople, and with it control of the straits.

In mid-November, the advance of the Bulgarian troops was stopped. Sazonov returned to the policy of maintaining the existing situation until the Russian Empire gained enough strength. He rejected the French ambassador's proposal for England, France and Russia to sign a declaration against any seizure of the straits. Sazonov also rejected Britain’s proposal to maintain the existing situation by declaring the Istanbul straits neutral waters.

World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire

In the autumn of 1918, the British army launched a decisive offensive in Mesopotamia, on the Syrian-Palestine front. The Turkish army suffered defeat after defeat. At the end of September the British captured Nazareth, in October Damascus, then Aleppo. On September 15, the Soviet government captured Baku and refused to implement the articles of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty relating to the Ottoman Empire. At the end of September, Bulgaria capitulated, as a result of which Entente troops received the right to move through Bulgarian territory towards the Turkish border.

Together with the military defeats of the German and Austrian armies, this meant the imminent fall of the Ottoman Empire. On October 5, 1918, the Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha turned to US President Woodrow Wilson for help, but received no response, and on October 19 the Ottoman cabinet resigned in its entirety. The new government turned to the Entente with a request for a truce.

On October 30, in the port of Mudros on the island of Lemnos, on board the English battleship Agamemnos, the surrender of the Ottoman Empire was signed, which formally took the form of a truce. The negotiations were led by the commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, Vice Admiral S. Calthorpe, and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff of Turkey participated from the Turkish side.

The first article of the treaty, dated October 30, 1918, provided for the opening of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to the Entente. From now on, Entente ships could pass freely in both directions. In addition, all military-economic centers of the country were subject to occupation by the Entente. The agreement also provided for the demobilization of the entire Turkish army and the refusal to recognize any state entities created with the participation of the Ottoman Turks in the Caucasus.

Part of Turkish territory, as well as the area of ​​the straits, was occupied by the Allied forces. The Ottoman Empire ceased to exist, and each state offered its own version of a new structure for Turkey. Thus, in February 1919, the Armenian leader Avetis Aharonyan addressed the Entente countries with a proposal to create an Armenian Democratic Republic, including some Anatolian lands and access to the Black Sea. The leader of the Kurdish nationalists, Sherif Pasha, demanded the creation of a Kurdish state.

However, a revolt soon broke out in central Turkey under the leadership of the Turkish general Mustafa Kemal against the Sultan's government. In the spring of 1920, the Kemalists seized power in Ankara, proclaiming their own government. Dual power arose in the country.

At the last meeting of the Paris Peace Conference on January 21, 1920, the Allies signed a peace treaty with the Sultan of Turkey (Treaty of Sèvres). According to this agreement, the Black Sea Straits came under the control of the Black Sea Straits Company, which, in turn, was subordinate to England, France and Italy. Turkey lost all Arabian territories, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and the islands of the Aegean Sea. Part of the territories in the east went to the Armenian Republic.

The government of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara categorically rejected the Treaty of Sèvres, and launched an offensive against the Armenian Republic. In the summer of 1920, the Armenian-Turkish war began. The Armenians asked the Entente for help, but the Turkish Sultan could not do anything, and the allies did not want to send their soldiers against the Kemalists.

Back in the spring of 1920, Mustafa Kemal applied for financial assistance to the government of Soviet Russia. And the establishment of Soviet power in Armenia in November 1920 turned out to be very opportune for the Kemalists. In the fall of the same year, the Soviet government sent 200 kg of gold to Ankara, and Kemal in response sent two gunboats to Novorossiysk to serve the Red Fleet.

On March 16, 1921, in Moscow, Soviet Russia and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, headed by Kemal, signed a peace treaty. According to this agreement, Kars and Ardagan were transferred to Turkey, and Batum was assigned to Georgia. The parties pledged not to engage in subversive activities against each other. In addition, Article VI of this treaty canceled all agreements previously signed between Turkey and Russia: “all agreements hitherto concluded between both countries do not correspond to mutual interests. They agree, therefore, to recognize these treaties as canceled and of no force.” Thus, the main international treaties that defined the boundaries and regime of the Black Sea straits were annulled. The development of the status of the Straits was transferred to the future Confederation of delegates from the coastal states.

On October 13, 1921, the Soviet Socialist Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other, concluded the Treaty of Kars. He confirmed the main provisions of the agreement signed earlier in Moscow and significantly strengthened Kemal’s position in international relations.

The Turkish issue was finally resolved at the Lausanne Peace Conference in April 1922. Turkey renounced its claims to Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, North African territories and Cyprus, retaining Eastern Thrace, Istanbul, the Straits, Izmir, Cilicia, southeast Anatolia and a number of small islands. The Treaty of Lausanne also provided for the demilitarization of the Bosporus and Dardanelles with the destruction of coastal fortifications and the free passage of merchant and military ships in peace and war.

The Lausanne Peace Conference was attended by France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and Turkey. The countries participating in the conference were not supposed to send more than three military vessels to the Black Sea; their tonnage was limited to 10 thousand. The size of the Istanbul garrison was also strictly limited, and Turkey was prohibited from having coastal batteries in the straits.

The Soviet representative signed the Convention on the Regime of the Straits on August 14, 1924, but the Soviet Union never ratified the Convention, believing that it violated the legal rights of the USSR and did not guarantee peace and security.

Turkish Sultan Mehmed VI could not stand the confrontation with Kemal and secretly fled from Istanbul in November 1922. On October 28, 1923, Turkey was officially proclaimed a Republic. The Lausanne Straits Convention was in force until 1936, before the Montreux Conference.

Montreux Convention

In 1936, at the request of Turkey, a conference was convened in the Swiss town of Montreux to revise the Lausanne Treaty on the Black Sea Straits. The conference took place from June 22 to July 20, 1936 and ended with the signing of a new convention on the regime of the Straits.

Merchant ships of all countries retained the right of free passage through the Black Sea straits. In peacetime, merchant ships could pass at any time of the day or night, regardless of flag or cargo. Moreover, every ship entering the straits from the Aegean or Black Sea is required to undergo a sanitary inspection.

The Montreux Convention sharply differentiated the rules for the passage through the Straits of ships of coastal and non-coastal states of the Black Sea. Only the Black Sea states were allowed to conduct warships through the Straits in peacetime (all types of surface ships, and in some cases submarines).

In the event of Turkey's participation in the war, the Turkish government reserves the right to allow the passage of warships of other powers through the Straits. Turkey can also take advantage of this article of the treaty if it “considers itself to be under immediate military danger.” Turkey also gained the opportunity to maintain armed forces in the Black Sea straits area without restrictions and build coastal fortifications there.

Turkey received the greatest benefit as a result of the signing of the Montreux Convention, although the USSR also received some benefits - in particular, in distinguishing between the military courts of the Black Sea and non-Black Sea states.

At the beginning of World War II, attempts were made to revise the Montreux Convention, although Turkey remained neutral from 1941 to 1944. The straits served as the most important transport route for Germany, Italy and Romania. Germany and Italy transferred troops and military equipment from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, only dismantling it for appearances. On February 23, 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan, and in fact became an ally of the Soviet Union.

Post-war disputes

Already at the end of the World War, disagreements began between Turkey and the USSR. In March 1945, the Soviet government canceled the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, as being inappropriate for the post-war situation. Molotov told the Turkish ambassador that the treaty required serious improvements.

By this time, the Soviet government had decided on its position regarding the Black Sea straits. It boiled down to the following: the Montreux Convention should be abolished, since it does not correspond to modern conditions; the regime of the Straits should be regulated not only by Turkey, but also by the Soviet Union; the new Straits regime should provide not only for the creation of Turkish military bases, but also Soviet ones, in the interests of the security of both countries and maintaining peace in the Black Sea region.

Molotov presented these theses at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, but was met with a categorical refusal from Great Britain and the United States, which no longer needed the support of the Soviet Union. England and the United States put forward a counter-proposal to allow ships of all states to pass through the Straits, both in peacetime and in wartime. The parties could not agree, and the Montreux Convention remained unchanged.

For a long time, Turkey maintained neutrality in international politics, but nevertheless joined NATO in 1952. To strengthen “peace and security” in 1959, Turkey allowed the deployment on its territory of a US missile squadron - 30 Jupiter missiles with a range of 3180 km. The USSR responded by placing missiles in Cuba, which gave rise to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Bridge over the Bosphorus

After the USSR agreed to remove its missiles from Cuba, in 1963 the United States removed a Jupiter squadron from Turkey. Since the mid-1960s. even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, relations with Turkey remained quite friendly. In 1964, a cultural agreement was signed between the two countries, and in 1967, an agreement on the construction of a number of cultural sites in Turkey with the financial and technical assistance of the USSR.

In 1984, the countries signed a long-term program for the development of economic, trade and technical cooperation for a period of 10 years, with the possibility of a further extension for 5 years by agreement of the parties. In the same year, an agreement was concluded on the supply of Soviet natural gas to Turkey for a period of 25 years, which contributed to the further growth of economic cooperation between the countries.

After the collapse of the USSR

The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 changed the situation in the region. Türkiye began to actively interfere in the internal politics of the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Also in 1994, the Turkish government unilaterally adopted new Regulations for navigation in the Black Sea Straits area. A number of articles of these Regulations, which came into force on July 1, 1994, provided for the introduction of a permitting procedure for passage for certain categories of ships, depending on their length, cargo carried, etc.

Currently, Russian oil is exported to Western Europe and the USA through the Black Sea straits. In terms of economic importance, the Bosphorus ranks second after the Pas-de-Calais Strait. In the 1990s. The Black Sea straits annually passed about 50 thousand ships, in the 2000s - already about 100 thousand ships, with about 20% of them transporting dangerous goods.

Sending oil tankers across the strait that divides one of the world's most populous cities is a difficult task. Any accident can lead to an environmental disaster. In 1994, the Greek oil tanker Nassia collided with another ship, killing 30 people and spilling 20,000 tons of oil into the Bosphorus. The oil ignited and the fire was extinguished within 5 days. Fortunately, the accident occurred north of the city, otherwise the consequences could have been more serious.

According to the Montreux Convention, Türkiye has no right to regulate merchant shipping. In 1999, a Russian tanker ran aground and split in half. At least 800 tons of fuel oil on board spilled into the waters of the Sea of ​​Marmara, destroying fish and plants on the shore in the disaster area.

In 1997, Russia and Turkey signed an agreement on natural gas supplies, and as part of this agreement, the Blue Stream pipeline was built. Gas supplies through the pipeline began in 2003. The volume of supplies gradually increased, which helped to slightly relieve shipping in the area of ​​the Black Sea straits.

The Montreux Convention is revised every 20 years and is renewed automatically by agreement of the signatory states. Today, thanks to the Montreux Convention, Russian ships freely deliver cargo from Novorossiysk and Sevastopol to the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia for the Russian military contingent in Syria.

Bosphorus Strait on the world map.

Bosphorus(“Istanbul Strait”) is a strait between Europe and Asia Minor, connecting the Black Sea with the Sea of ​​Marmara. On both sides of the strait stands the Turkish city of Istanbul. The strait provides access to the Mediterranean Sea and the seas of most of Russia, Ukraine, Transcaucasia and southeastern Europe.

Istanbul... The ancient capital of three mighty empires - Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman. A city that separates and at the same time unites Western and Eastern civilization and uniquely conveys the exquisite oriental flavor and culture of modern Europe.

Istanbul, a metropolis of 15 million inhabitants, dates back to the 7th century BC. And even in that distant time, when it was still called Byzantium, the city was a major port and center of maritime trade. This was facilitated by its strategically good location.

The magnificent city of Istanbul is located on the border of two continents, so the Bosphorus can rightly be called the heart of the city. The amazingly beautiful Bosphorus Strait enchants with its waters and contrasting shores. Next to fishing villages and modern skyscrapers, there are majestic palaces that perfectly reflect the fate of the city - a symbol of the interweaving of luxury and poverty, antiquity and modernity.

Bosphorus extends 30 kilometers in length, its maximum width is 3700 meters, its minimum is 700 meters, and the depth of the strait reaches 80 meters.

The mirror waters of the Bosphorus, betraying the charm of the old city, cannot be compared with anything else; they are in all possible shades of green, turquoise and blue. All the greatness and squalor of Constantinople is reflected in the sparkling surface of this strait. Summer residences and elegant palaces, which are randomly scattered along the banks, peacefully coexist with ramshackle villages inhabited by fishermen. Only occasionally the impression created by ancient buildings is destroyed by the steely shine of modern skyscrapers.

Map of the Bosphorus Strait in Russian

Sasha Mitrakhovich 21.10.2015 15:39

The Bosphorus is surrounded by many legends that have their own versions of the origin of the name of the strait. One of the most common is that the strait got its name thanks to the beautiful Io, which Zeus turned into a white cow. The unfortunate girl jumped into the water, which has since been called the “cow ford” or the Bosphorus.

The name of the Bosphorus Strait comes from two Greek words: “bull” and “passage” - “cow ford”, and the strait itself is closely connected with ancient Greek myths, one of which says that:

Zeus fell in love with Io, the priestess of Hera, who was the daughter of King Inachus. For this, the wife of the loving Zeus turned Io into a cow and sent a terrible hornet at her, from which Io tried in vain to escape. What helped her out was that she hid in the waters of the Bosphorus, which after that got its name - “cow ford”.

Sasha Mitrakhovich 22.10.2015 21:02

The Bosphorus Strait on the world map is located in the territory of modern Turkey and separates Europe and Asia, and Istanbul is located on both sides.

The Bosphorus Strait is a 30-kilometer winding crack connecting the Black Sea with and further, through, with the Mediterranean, has a depth of 30 to 80 meters, and its maximum width does not exceed 4 kilometers.

Bosphorus Strait on the World Map:

Sasha Mitrakhovich 22.10.2015 21:11

The banks of the Bosphorus are connected by the Bosphorus Bridge, which is more than 1,000 meters long, and the Sultan Mehmed Fatih Bridge, which is 1,090 meters long. It is also planned to build a third road bridge with a length of 1,275 meters.

If we turn to real, and not imaginary history, we can find out that the first to build a bridge across the strait was the Persian king Darius, who transported an army of seven hundred thousand across the Bosporus on a temporary bridge, which consisted of rafts thrown from ship to ship. As grandiose an undertaking as he accomplished in engineering terms, the campaign to the Scythian possessions itself was a mediocre failure. Without accepting a single battle, Darius lost his entire unimaginably huge army.

There are two bridges across the Bosphorus. The first of them is called Bosphorus. Since its completion in 1973, almost 200,000 vehicles pass through it every day from one continent to another. It is Istanbul's most famous landmark. The total length of this suspension bridge is 1560 meters.

The second bridge bears the name of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, it is also called the “Second Bosphorus Bridge”. The bridge was built near the Rumeli-Hisary fortress for the 535th anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople by Sultan Mehmed Fatih, its length is slightly less - 1510 meters, it was completed in 1988. At the time when it began to be built, many said that the bridge could spoil the silhouette of the city and all the beauty of the Bosphorus. But, despite this, the bridge, built in one of the most beautiful cities in the world, among the great historical monuments, along with its mosques and palaces, was able to harmoniously fit into the convolutions of the surrounding hills.

Third Bosphorus Bridge(Sultan Selim the Terrible Bridge), the construction of which began in 2013, will cross the Bosphorus in its northern part, at the exit to the Black Sea. The bridge will combine two railway lines and eight car lanes at one level. Construction of the bridge is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2015.

Monstrously huge, during the day they look like graceful thin threads stretched from one shore to another, and at night they shine under the starry sky with lights of all the colors of the rainbow.

Today's residents of Turkey are proud of their bridges across the strait.

Sasha Mitrakhovich 22.10.2015 21:13

Marmaray Tunnel under Bosphorus Strait. In the fall of 2013, a railway tunnel was opened along the bottom of the Bosphorus, connecting the two continents. Only four minutes on it - and the strait is crossed. And from the final station to the final station on the Marmaray line it takes 18 minutes, then you can change to the metro.

A tunnel was built to reduce the load on existing bridges across the Bosphorus and to reduce atmospheric gas pollution. During construction, engineers took special care of the safety of passengers; all possible measures were taken to ensure that the Marmaray tunnel was not damaged by tremors in this earthquake-prone area.

Sasha Mitrakhovich 22.10.2015 21:15

Beautiful panoramas do not cause satiety. On the shores of the strait there is a mixture of past and present, luxury and poverty: marble palaces adjoin the ruins of stone fortresses, modern hotels stand next to wooden yawls.

Since the end of the 17th century, during the Ottoman Empire, pashas, ​​viziers and simply wealthy families built houses, mansions and palaces along the coast, where previously there was only a scattering of fishing villages. Then the architectural brainchild of the Bosphorus arose - the seaside mansion - yali. Translated from Turkish it means “house by the water.”

Usually it was a wooden house of several floors, standing at the very edge of the water. This tradition has survived to this day. Many ancient yawls that have survived to this day, after restoration, became restaurants, expensive boutique hotels and homes of the city elite.

Sasha Mitrakhovich 22.10.2015 21:19

There are many convenient bays in the strait. The most beautiful of which is. This bay, with its shape, resembled a horn, which is why in ancient times it was called “Horned Bay”. The shores of this bay are as winding as the shores of the Bosphorus, so the bay forms a convenient anchorage for large and small ships. There are no rivers at the mouth of this harbor, so the waters have always been clean and transparent.

In addition, the Golden Horn is reliably protected from the winds. Winter here begins no earlier than December, and snow on the Bosphorus is very rare. Autumn is quite long and is the best time to visit the strait.

Sasha Mitrakhovich 22.10.2015 21:20

The most common theory (the "Black Sea Flood Theory") states that the Bosporus Strait was formed around 5600 BC. as a result of the melting of large masses of ice and snow at the end of the last ice age, due to a sharp rise in water levels by 140 meters.

The level of the Black and Mediterranean Seas was then 120 m below the level of the World Ocean and there was no communication between the seas.

In just a matter of days, a powerful stream made its way from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea, which at that time was a freshwater lake.

This is indicated, in particular, by the bottom topography, as well as the change in aquatic plants and sedimentary rocks from freshwater to saltwater at approximately the time indicated above. Recent archaeological research has uncovered submerged cities on the underwater slopes of Turkey's Black Sea coast.

Most likely, it was the formation of the Bosphorus that became the reason for the emergence of the myth of the Flood and Noah's Ark. By the way, Mount Ararat is located relatively nearby, in Eastern Anatolia.

Another reason for the appearance of the strait could be an earthquake.

Sasha Mitrakhovich 22.10.2015 21:23

To fully experience the Bosphorus Strait, you need to take a fascinating cruise along the strait on board any tourist boat in the Karakoy quarter. A walk along the Bosphorus Strait is an indescribable pleasure. The whole of Istanbul with its inherent grandeur and pathos will appear before your eyes. Finding yourself on board a pleasure boat in the evening, you can try to look into the very soul of the “miracle of miracles” - the ancient Greek name for Constantinople.

The city at sunset seems to put on its most beautiful mask. In the cramped conditions of departing ferries, crowded ships, the roar of trumpets during the setting sun, you can watch the city light up its wonderful lights on the hills. The voices of the muezzins are heard. They say that in the old days blind heralds were often hired for evening prayers so that they would not be embarrassed by the beauty of the coming night. Hagia Sophia, like the mast of a ship, rises above the city and gives it an unearthly enchanting view from the Bosphorus.

You can see all this from board a regular passenger and tourist ferry, starting from Eminonu and passing almost to the Black Sea. The final destination is Anadolu-Kavagi, where you can get off, walk for a couple of hours and return back on the next flight with the same ticket. Or on excursion yachts from the same Eminonu, but they will take you maximum to the second bridge, and will cost more.

There is nothing more spectacular than the Bosphorus in the evening. Painted with the scarlet color of the setting sun, the Bosphorus Strait and the city put on a special mask, mysterious and enchanting.

This is the narrowest point of the Bosphorus - only about 650 meters. This is where Europe comes closest to Asia. And here, between the two fortresses, in the old days they stretched a huge iron chain across the strait and “locked” the Bosporus for incoming ships.

The Bosphorus Strait has an important geopolitical position. Since the Trojan War of the XIII-XII centuries. BC e. it has repeatedly become a cause of international tension, especially during periods of weakening of one of the main great powers.

Sasha Mitrakhovich 22.10.2015 21:27

common name for the Bosphorus straits, Dardanelles and the Sea of ​​Marmara located between them. The Black Sea is the only route of communication between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Private transport routes occupy a special position in the system of international sea routes. While Byzantium, and after the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, the Ottoman Empire, dominated the entire Black Sea coast and, because of this, the Black Sea was actually their internal sea, the use of the Black Sea was an internal matter of these states. By the end of the 17th century. the situation has changed significantly. Peter I began building the Azov Fleet and in 1696 took Azov, Russia reached the coast of the Azov and Black Seas. Now the question of entering and exiting the Black Sea has acquired an international character, subsequently forming an important part of the so-called. Eastern Question (See Eastern Question). For a long time, the efforts of Russian diplomacy, which sought to open the Black Sea and Ch. p. for the Russian fleet, did not bring success. According to the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace of 1774 (See Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace of 1774), Russia was granted the right of merchant shipping in the Black Sea and the Black Sea. Later, other states received the same right (with the exception of states at war with Turkey). A much more difficult matter for Russian diplomacy was resolving the issue of the passage of warships. The security interests of the Black Sea countries required the establishment of a regime in the Black Sea region that, while providing their navies with reliable communications with the open seas, would at the same time protect these countries from the threat of aggression from non-Black Sea powers. This principle was clearly formulated in 1802 by Chancellor A. R. Vorontsov in response to the claims of France, which sought the right of passage through the Black Sea crossing for its navy. Turkey also took a similar position to Russia at that time. Without allowing warships of non-Black Sea countries into the Black Sea, it, according to the Russian-Turkish alliance treaties (See Russian-Turkish alliance treaties) of 1799 and 1805, granted Russian warships the right of passage to the Mediterranean Sea.

Meanwhile, the non-Black Sea powers, primarily Great Britain and France, sought to obtain the right of unrestricted access to the Black Sea for their not only commercial but also military ships, while simultaneously prohibiting the passage of the Russian military fleet through the Black Sea. But since it was not possible to openly substantiate such an unlawful demand, they sought “equality” with Russia, that is, either the complete opening or complete closure of the emergency zone for warships of all countries.

Under the influence of Napoleonic diplomacy, Turkey in 1806 abolished, in violation of the 1805 alliance treaty with Russia, the free passage of Russian ships through the straits. Subsequently, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–12, Great Britain imposed a treaty on Turkey (1809), which, under the guise of the “ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire,” prohibited the passage of warships of any foreign power through the Black Sea checkpoint (see article Anglo-Turkish contracts) . The Unkar-Iskelesi Treaty of 1833, effectively restoring the Russian-Turkish alliance, obliged Turkey to close the Dardanelles to the passage of warships of other states at Russia’s request. However, the London Convention of 1840 revived the supposedly always existing “ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire.”

The first multilateral international agreement on emergency clauses, the London Convention of 1841, confirmed the “ancient rule” and turned it into an international obligation. Thus, Turkey and Russia have lost their right to independently, through bilateral agreements, regulate the procedure for the admission of military ships into and out of the Black Sea. The Russian navy found itself locked in the Black Sea. The prohibition of warships of non-Black Sea states from entering the Black Sea was not of significant value for Russia, especially since it was provided for by the 1841 convention only for peacetime. Meanwhile, Turkey, becoming increasingly dependent on the Western European powers, often made exceptions for them from the “ancient rule.” This was one of the important motives that pushed Tsarist Russia into war with Turkey in 1853 (see Crimean War 1853-1856 (See Crimean War 1853-56)). The Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, which ended this war, prohibited Russia, under the guise of an obligation to support the “neutralization” of the Black Sea, from taking effective measures to protect its Black Sea coast. In 1870, the Russian government refused to recognize the articles of the Treaty of Paris on the “neutralization” of the Black Sea; The London Convention of 1871 authorized the repeal of these articles. However, the regime of private rights was defined in this convention on almost the same basis as in 1841. The same system was preserved by the Berlin Treaty of 1878 (see article Berlin Congress of 1878).

Until World War I, Russian diplomacy tried in vain to change the state of emergency regime, which was unfavorable for Russia. There were cases, for example in 1891 and 1894, when the Turkish Sultan issued firmans for the passage of Russian warships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles (without weapons and without armed guards). ), but non-Black Sea powers made it difficult to obtain such permits, and during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, Great Britain staged a naval demonstration near the Dardanelles to prevent the passage of Russian warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and their appearance in the Far East. International supervision over the emergency situation was also disadvantageous for Turkey, because violated its sovereignty, contributed to the transformation of Turkey into a semi-colony of imperialist powers, and created a dangerous aggravation of relations with Russia. At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. Great Britain and France enjoyed the greatest economic and political influence in Turkey. But in the years immediately preceding World War I, Germany’s position also strengthened significantly. After Turkey entered World War I, the secret Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement of 1915 was signed on the German side. which provided for the inclusion of Constantinople (Istanbul) and the Black Sea region into the Russian Empire. This agreement was intended to maintain the interest of Russia's ruling circles in bringing the war with Germany to a victorious end.

After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Soviet Russia announced its renunciation of the secret treaties of the tsarist government, the agreement on Constantinople and the Ch. ) The navy of the Entente powers entered the Black Sea. In 1920, Istanbul was occupied by Entente troops. The imperialist powers used their dominance over Istanbul and the Black Sea zone to carry out armed intervention in the south of Soviet Russia, and also (through the Greek army) to intervene against Turkey. According to the Peace Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, signed by the Sultan’s government (See Peace Treaty of Sèvres of 1920), the issue of emergency rule was resolved in favor of the imperialist powers.

The Treaty of Sèvres did not come into force because The Anglo-Greek intervention in Turkey was defeated. The principles for resolving the issue of the straits, which met the interests of both Soviet Russia and Turkey, were developed by V.I. Lenin. They were recorded in the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921 between the RSFSR and Turkey, which provided for the development of an international statute for the Black Sea and the Black Sea Clause by a conference “... of delegates from the coastal states, provided that the decisions made by it do not harm the full sovereignty of Turkey, as well as the security of Turkey and its capital Constantinople.” Identical articles were included in the Treaty of Kars 1921 and into the Ukrainian-Turkish Treaty of 1922. At the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23 (See Lausanne Conference of 1922-23), the Soviet delegation led a persistent struggle for a fair solution to the issue of the straits. The Lausanne Convention on the Straits, signed on July 24, 1923, established that the emergency zone was demilitarized and declared open to the passage of any warships. This regime put the Black Sea countries at risk of aggression, so the Soviet Union did not ratify the Lausanne Convention. In April 1936, the Turkish government, counting on the support of Great Britain, which was interested in involving Turkey in the orbit of its Mediterranean policy and the use of Turkish naval bases, invited the powers participating in the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23 to negotiate to conclude a new convention on emergency clauses. In June 1936 An international conference on the issue of private security opened in Montreux (see Montreux conference 1936), which ended with the signing of a new convention on the Black Sea on July 20, 1936. It took into account, although not completely, the interests of the Black Sea countries. They were allowed to conduct any of their ships through the Black Sea crossing, subject to the established rules of passage, while the admission of warships of non-Black Sea powers was limited by tonnage, class, and duration of stay in the Black Sea; the passage of warships of the warring powers was prohibited; Turkey, in the event of its entry into war or being under the threat of war, had the right to permit or prohibit the passage of any military vessels through the straits.

During World War II (1939-45), Turkey, having declared its neutrality after Germany’s attack on the USSR, provided the fascist aggressors with the opportunity to use the Black Sea for their own purposes. In light of these circumstances, the Potsdam Conference of 1945 recognized that the Montreux Convention should be revised. In 1946, the USSR began negotiations with Turkey, but the Turkish government rejected the Soviet proposal. In 1953, the Soviet government told the Turkish government that it had revised its previous opinion regarding these proposals. Thus, the 1936 Convention remains an international act regulating shipping in the Black Sea region.

Lit.: Lenin V.I., Interview with Observer and Manchester Guardian correspondent M. Farbman, Complete. collection cit., 5th ed., vol. 45; Ulyanitsky V. A., Dardanelles Bosphorus and the Black Sea in the 18th century, M., 1883; Goryainov S. M., Bosphorus and Dardanelles, St. Petersburg, 1907; Straits. [Sb.], M., 1923; Dranov B.A., Black Sea Straits. International legal regime, M., 1948; Miller A.F., Türkiye and the problems of the straits, M., 1947; Altman V.V., From the history of the struggle for the straits after the First World War, in the collection: From the history of social movements and international relations, M., 1957; Zhivkova L., On the issue of revising the Lausanne Convention on the regime of the Straits in Anglo-Turkish relations in 1933-1935, in the collection: Problems of British history. 1973, M., 1973; Dascovici N., La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, Gen., 1915; Fuad Ali, La question des Détroits, P., 1928; Howard H., The partition of Turkey, N.Y., 1966; Puryear V. J., England, Russia and the straits question 1844-1856, Berk., 1931; Irtem Süleyman Kâni, Bogazlar meselesi, Ist., 1936; Abrévaya J., La conférence de Montreux et le régime des Détroits, P., 1938; Bremoy G. de, La conférence de Montreux et le nouveau régime des détroits, P., 1939; Shotwell J. T., Déak F., Turkey at the straits. A short history, N.Y., 1940.

A. F. Miller.

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"Black Sea Straits" in books

The Black Sea waves are singing THE STORY

From the book The Black Sea Waves Sing author Krupatkin Boris Lvovich

The Black Sea waves are singing THE STORY Dedicated to Konstantin Ivanovich Agarkov, former chief mate of the guards cruiser "Red Caucasus", guard captain of the 1st rank in

BLACK SEA STEPPE 67.

From the book Ancient Rus' author

BLACK SEA STEPPE67. At the beginning of the second millennium BC. copper instruments and utensils appeared on the territory of Ukraine and the Don. Bronze things followed them; by the middle of this millennium, copper and bronze culture had taken root in the Black Sea steppes. She was in

BLACK SEA STEPPE 85.

From the book Ancient Rus' author Vernadsky Georgy Vladimirovich

BLACK SEA STEPPE85. During the Cimmerian period, the population of the Black Sea steppes mainly used bronze tools and goods, although iron products had been known since 900 BC. Later the Scythians brought with them their own distinct culture, which included both bronze and

Straits

From the book World Cold War author Utkin Anatoly Ivanovich

Straits In a situation of growing hostility, the natural desire of the USSR as a Black Sea power to ensure freedom of navigation through the Black Sea straits, which open access to the World Ocean for the Soviet Union, was used by the Americans for their own purposes. Byrnes still

Chapter I Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and the Black Sea Straits

author Luneva Yulia Viktorovna

Chapter I Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and the Black Sea Straits At the beginning of the 20th century. There have been fundamental changes in the international situation. Russia was defeated in the war with Japan, and the First Russian Revolution of 1905–1907 took place. On the world stage, Russia's position was serious

Chapter IV Balkan Wars 1912–1913 and Black Sea straits

From the book Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Secret provocations on the eve of the First World War (1907–1914) author Luneva Yulia Viktorovna

Chapter IV Balkan Wars 1912–1913 and Black Sea

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From the book Empire. From Catherine II to Stalin author Deinichenko Petr Gennadievich

Black Sea shores All the time that the Pugachev uprising was raging, Russia was at war with Turkey. It began in 1768 due to Russian intervention in Polish affairs. From the very beginning of her reign, Catherine II sought to establish Stanislav on the Polish throne

Straits

From the book Encyclopedic Dictionary (P) author Brockhaus F.A.

Straits Straits are more or less narrow parts of the sea, between two continents, for example. Gibraltar, Bosphorus, Kerch; mainland and island, for example. Sound, Bab el-Mandeb, or between 2 islands, e.g. Great Belt, Bonifacio (between Sardinia and Corsica). Some sea

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From the book Universal Encyclopedic Reference author Isaeva E. L.

Straits of Bab el-Mandeb (Indian Ocean; 109 km) Bassa (Indian Ocean; 490 km) Bering (Pacific Ocean; 96 km) Great Belt (Atlantic Ocean; 120 km) Bosphorus (Atlantic Ocean; 30 km) Vilkitsky (Arctic ocean; 104 km) Gibraltar (Atlantic Ocean;

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From the book Crossword Guide author Kolosova Svetlana

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§ 1.3. "Black Sea"

From the book Russian Icebreaker Fleet, 1860s - 1918. author Andrienko Vladimir Grigorievich

§ 1.3. “Black Sea” According to the five-year program of the Maritime Ministry, 4 identical towing-icebreaking (“ice-cutting”) steamships with a capacity of 450 hp each were built at the Machine and Bridge Plant in Helsingfors from May 1914; 2 of them were originally intended for

BLACK SEA STRAITS

From the book Naval Espionage. History of the confrontation author Huchthausen Peter

BLACK SEA STRAITS One of the delicate tasks facing the Navy intelligence agency was tracking shipping in the Black Sea Straits. As the Soviet Navy became a force operating on the seas and oceans of the planet, its ships, due to geography,

15. Straits

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15. Straits The Black Sea straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles have at all times been strategically significant for Russia. For the south of the huge empire, they were the only exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, which at the end of the 19th century was the center of world civilization and

Chapter 4.2. Black Sea ordeals

From the book Deep-sea vehicles (milestones of deep-sea topics) author Shanikhin Evgeniy Nikolaevich

Chapter 4.2. Black Sea ordeals The construction of the experimental deep-sea vehicle “Poisk-6” began in 1971 by the Novo-Admiralteysky Plant according to the 1906 project and working design documentation developed by LPM B “Rubin”. Construction management at the plant was

And the Gallipoli Peninsula, located in the European part of Turkey. The Dardanelles Strait, whose width ranges from 1.3 km to 6 km and a length of 65 km, is of great strategic importance, as it is part of the waterway connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Black Sea.

Sea of ​​Gella

The outdated name of the strait is Hellespont, which is translated from Greek as “Sea of ​​Hell”. This name is associated with the ancient myth of twins, brother and sister, Phrixus and Hell. Born by the Orchomen king Athamas and Nephele, the children were soon left without a mother - they were raised by the evil stepmother Ino. She wanted to destroy her brother and sister, but the twins escaped on a flying ram with golden wool. During the flight, Gella slipped into the water and died. The place where the girl fell - between Chersonesos and Sigei - has since been nicknamed the “Sea of ​​Hell”. The Dardanelles Strait received its modern name from the name of the ancient city that once stood on its shore - Dardania.

Bosphorus

This is another Black Sea strait. The Bosphorus connects the Black Sea with the Sea of ​​Marmara. The strait is approximately 30 kilometers long, its width ranges from 700 m to 3700 m. The depth of the fairway is from 36 to 124 m. Istanbul (historical Constantinople) is located on both sides of the strait. The banks of the Bosphorus are connected by two bridges: the Bosphorus (length - 1074 meters) and the Sultan Mehmed Fatih Bridge (length - 1090 meters). In 2013, the Marmaray railway underwater tunnel was built to connect the Asian and European parts of Istanbul.

Geographical position

The Dardanelles Strait and the Bosphorus are located 190 kilometers apart. Between them there is an area of ​​11.5 thousand km2. A ship sailing from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean must first enter the rather narrow Bosporus, pass Istanbul, sail to the Sea of ​​Marmara, after which it will meet the Dardanelles. This strait ends which, in turn, is part of the Mediterranean. The length of this path does not exceed 170

Strategic importance

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles are links in the chain connecting the closed sea (Black) with the open sea (Mediterranean). These straits have more than once become the subject of dispute between the leading world powers. For Russia in the 19th century, the route to the Mediterranean provided access to the center of world trade and civilization. In the modern world it is also important, it is the “key” to the Black Sea. The international convention stipulates that the passage of commercial and military ships through the Black Sea straits should be free and free. However, Turkey, which is the main regulator of traffic through the Bosphorus Strait, is trying to use this situation to its advantage. When oil exports from Russia greatly increased in 2004, Turkey authorized restrictions on ship traffic in the Bosphorus. Traffic jams appeared in the strait, and oil workers began to suffer all sorts of losses for missed delivery deadlines and tanker downtime. Russia has officially accused Turkey of deliberately complicating traffic on the Bosphorus in order to redirect oil export traffic to the port of Ceyhan, whose services are paid. This is not Turkey's only attempt to capitalize on its geophysical position. The country has developed a project for the construction of the Bosphorus Canal. The idea is good, but the Republic of Turkey has not yet found investors to implement this project.

Fighting in the region

In antiquity, the Dardanelles belonged to the Greeks, and the main city in the region was Abydos. In 1352, the Asian shore of the strait passed to the Turks and Çanakkale became the dominant city.

According to a treaty concluded in 1841, only Turkish warships could pass through the Dardanelles. The First Balkan War put an end to this state of affairs. The Greek fleet defeated the Turkish fleet at the entrance to the straits twice: in 1912, on December 16, during the Battle of Elli, and in 1913, on January 18, in the Battle of Lemnos. After that, I did not dare to leave the strait anymore.

During the First World War, bloody battles were fought for the Dardanelles between Atlanta and Turkey. In 1915, Sir decided to knock Turkey out of the war at once, breaking through to the country's capital through the Dardanelles Strait. The First Lord of the Admiralty was deprived of military talent, so the operation failed. The campaign was poorly planned and poorly executed. In one day, the Anglo-French fleet lost three battleships, the remaining ships were seriously damaged and miraculously survived. The landing of soldiers on the Gallipoli Peninsula turned into an even greater tragedy. 150 thousand people died in a positional meat grinder that did not bring any results. After a Turkish destroyer and a German submarine sank three more British battleships, and the second landing in Suvla Bay was ingloriously defeated, it was decided to curtail the military operation. A book entitled “Dardanelles 1915. Churchill’s Bloodiest Defeat” was written about the circumstances of the greatest disaster in British military history.

The question of the straits

While the Byzantine and then the Ottoman Empire dominated the area of ​​the straits, the issue of their functioning was decided within the states themselves. However, at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries, the situation changed - Russia reached the coast of the Black and Azov Seas. The problem of control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles has risen on the international agenda.

In 1841, at a conference in London, an agreement was reached that the straits would be closed to the passage of warships in peacetime. Since 1936, according to modern international law, the Straits area has been considered the “high seas” and issues regarding it are regulated by the Montreux Convention relating to the Status of the Straits. Thus, control over the straits is carried out while maintaining Turkish sovereignty.

Provisions of the Montreux Convention

The convention states that merchant ships of any state have free access to passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles both in war and in peacetime. The Black Sea powers can conduct military vessels of any class through the straits. Non-Black Sea states can only allow small surface ships to pass through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

If Turkey is involved in hostilities, the country can, at its discretion, allow warships of any power through. During a war in which the Republic of Turkey has no connection, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus must be closed to military courts.

The last conflict in which the mechanisms provided for by the Convention were involved was the South Ossetian crisis in August 2008. At this time, US Navy warships were passed through the straits and proceeded towards the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi.

Conclusion

The Dardanelles Strait occupies very little space on the map of Eurasia. However, the strategic importance of this transport corridor on the continent cannot be overestimated. From an economic point of view, what is important for Russia is, first of all, the export of petroleum products. Transporting “black gold” by water is much cheaper than by oil pipeline. Every day, 136 ships pass through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, 27 of them are tankers. The density of traffic through the Black Sea straits is four times higher than the intensity of the Panama Canal, and three times higher than the Suez Canal. Due to the low passability of the straits, the Russian Federation suffers daily losses of approximately $12.3 million. However, a worthy alternative has not yet been found.