Kuban Cossacks during the Civil War. Kuban Cossacks during the years of Soviet power (civil war, years of repression)

According to the 1897 census, military Cossacks with families numbered 2,928,842 people, or 2.3% of the total population. The bulk of the Cossacks (63.6%) lived on the territory of 15 provinces, where there were 11 Cossack troops - Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Ural, Orenburg, Siberian, Transbaikal, Amur and Ussuri. The most numerous were the Don Cossacks (1,026,263 people or about a third of the total number of Cossacks in the country). It accounted for up to 41% of the region's population. Then came Kubanskoye - 787,194 people. (41% of the population of the Kuban region). Transbaikal - 29.1% of the region's population, Orenburg - 22.8%, Terek - 17.9%, the same amount in Amur, Ural - 17.7%. At the turn of the century there was a significant increase in population: from 1894 to 1913. the population of the 4 largest troops increased by 52% 2.

The troops arose at different times and on different principles - for the Don Army, for example, the process of growing into the Russian state lasted from the 17th to the 19th centuries. The fate of some other Cossack troops was similar. Gradually, the free Cossacks turned into a military-service, feudal class. There was a kind of “nationalization” of the Cossacks. Seven of the eleven troops (in the eastern regions) were created by government decrees and were built as “state” from the very beginning. In principle, the Cossacks were an estate, however, today judgments are increasingly heard that they are also a subethnic group, characterized by a common historical memory, self-awareness and a sense of solidarity 3.

The growth of national self-awareness of the Cossacks - the so-called. “Cossack nationalism” was noticeably observed at the beginning of the twentieth century. The state, interested in the Cossacks as a military support, actively supported these sentiments and guaranteed certain privileges. In the conditions of growing land hunger that struck the peasantry, the class isolation of the troops turned out to be a successful means of protecting the lands.

Throughout its history, the Cossacks did not remain unchanged - each era had its own Cossack: at first he was a “free man”, then he was replaced by a “service man”, a warrior in the service of the state. Gradually, this type began to become a thing of the past. Already from the second half of the 19th century, the type of Cossack-farmer became predominant, whom only the system and tradition forced to take up arms 4. At the beginning of the 20th century, there was an increase in contradictions between the Cossack-farmer and the Cossack-warrior. It was the latter type that power tried to preserve and sometimes artificially cultivated.

Life changed, and, accordingly, the Cossacks changed. The tendency towards self-liquidation of the military class in its traditional form became more and more pronounced. The spirit of change seemed to be in the air - the first revolution aroused the Cossacks' interest in politics, the issues of spreading the Stolypin reform to Cossack territories, introducing zemstvos there, etc. were discussed at the highest level.

1917 was a landmark and fateful year for the Cossacks. The events of February had serious consequences: the abdication of the emperor, among other things, destroyed the centralized control of the Cossack troops. The bulk of the Cossacks were in an uncertain state for a long time, did not take part in political life - the habit of obedience, the authority of commanders, and a poor understanding of political programs affected them. Meanwhile, politicians had their own vision of the Cossacks’ positions, most likely due to the events of the first Russian revolution, when the Cossacks were involved in police service and suppressing unrest. Confidence in the counter-revolutionary nature of the Cossacks was characteristic of both the left and the right. Meanwhile, capitalist relations penetrated deeper and deeper into the Cossack environment, destroying the class “from within.” But the traditional awareness of oneself as a single community somewhat preserved this process.

However, soon enough, understandable confusion was replaced by independent proactive actions. Elections of atamans are being held for the first time. In mid-April, the Military Circle elected the military chieftain of the Orenburg Cossack army, Major General N.P. Maltsev. In May, the Great Military Circle created the Don Military Government headed by Generals A.M. Kaledin and M.P. Bogaevsky. The Ural Cossacks generally refused to elect an ataman, motivating their refusal by the desire to have not individual, but popular power.

In March 1917, on the initiative of member of the IV State Duma I.N. Efremov and deputy military chieftain M.P. Bogaevsky, a general Cossack congress was convened with the aim of creating a special body under the Provisional Government to defend the interests of the Cossack class. The Chairman of the Union of Cossack Troops was A.I. Dutov, an active supporter of preserving the identity of the Cossacks and their freedoms. The Union stood for strong power and supported the Provisional Government. At that time, A. Dutov called A. Kerensky “a bright citizen of the Russian land.”

In counterbalance, the radical left forces created an alternative body on March 25, 1917 - the Central Council of Labor Cossacks, headed by V.F. Kostenetsky. The positions of these bodies were diametrically opposed. They both claimed the right to represent the interests of the Cossacks, although neither one nor the other were genuine representatives of the interests of the majority, their election was also very conditional.

By the summer, the Cossack leaders were disappointed - both in the personality of the “fair citizen” and in the policies pursued by the Provisional Government. A few months of activity by the “democratic” government was enough for the country to be on the verge of collapse. A. Dutov’s speeches at the end of the summer of 1917, his reproaches to the powers that be are bitter, but fair. He was probably one of the few who even then took a firm political position. The main position of the Cossacks during this period can be defined by the word “waiting” or “waiting.” The stereotype of behavior - the authorities give orders - worked for some time. Apparently this is why the Chairman of the Union of Cossack Troops, military foreman A. Dutov, did not directly participate in L.G. Kornilov’s speech, but rather pointedly refused to condemn the “rebellious” commander in chief. He was not alone in this: in the end, 76.2% of the regiments, the Council of the Union of Cossack Troops, the Circles of the Don, Orenburg and some other troops declared support for the Kornilov speech. The Provisional Government was actually losing the Cossacks. Individual steps to correct the situation no longer helped. Having lost his post, A. Dutov was immediately elected at the Extraordinary Circle as ataman of the Orenburg army.

It is significant that in the conditions of a deepening crisis in various Cossack troops, their leaders adhered in principle to one line of behavior - the isolation of Cossack regions as a protective measure. At the first news of the Bolshevik uprising, the military governments (Don, Orenburg) assumed full state power and introduced martial law.

The bulk of the Cossacks remained politically inert, but still a certain part occupied a position different from the position of the atamans. The authoritarianism of the latter came into conflict with the democratic sentiments characteristic of the Cossacks. In the Orenburg Cossack army there was an attempt to create the so-called. “Cossack Democratic Party” (T.I. Sedelnikov, M.I. Sveshnikov), the executive committee of which later transformed into an opposition group of deputies of the Circle. Similar views were expressed by F.K. Mironov in an “Open Letter” to a member of the Don Military Government P.M. Ageev on December 15, 1917 about the demands of the Cossacks - “the re-election of members of the Military Circle on a democratic basis” 5.

Another common detail: the newly emerged leaders opposed themselves to the majority of the Cossack population and miscalculated in assessing the mood of the returning front-line soldiers. In general, front-line soldiers are a factor that worries everyone and can fundamentally influence the fragile balance that has arisen. The Bolsheviks considered it necessary to first disarm the front-line soldiers, arguing that the latter “could” join “the counter-revolution.” As part of the implementation of this decision, dozens of trains heading east were detained in Samara, which ultimately created an extremely explosive situation. The 1st and 8th preferential regiments of the Ural Army, who did not want to surrender their weapons, entered into battle with the local garrison near Voronezh. Front-line Cossack units began to arrive on the territory of the troops from the end of 1917. The atamans were unable to rely on the new arrivals: the Urals refused to support the White Guard being created in Uralsk, in Orenburg on the Krug the front-line soldiers expressed “displeasure” to the ataman for “mobilizing the Cossacks, .. caused a split among the Cossacks" 6.

Almost everywhere, the Cossacks who returned from the front openly and persistently declared their neutrality. Their position was shared by the majority of Cossacks locally. The Cossack “leaders” did not find mass support. On the Don, Kaledin was forced to commit suicide; in the Orenburg region, Dutov was unable to rouse the Cossacks to fight and was forced to flee Orenburg with 7 like-minded people; an attempt by the cadets of the Omsk ensign school led to the arrest of the leadership of the Siberian Cossack Army. In Astrakhan, the performance under the leadership of the ataman of the Astrakhan army, General I.A. Biryukov, lasted from January 12 (25) to January 25 (February 7), 1918, after which he was shot. Everywhere the performances were small in number; they were mainly officers, cadets and small groups of ordinary Cossacks. Front-line soldiers even took part in the suppression.

A number of villages fundamentally refused to participate in what was happening - as was stated in the order to delegates to the Small Military Circle from a number of villages, “until the matter of the civil war is clarified, remain neutral” 7. However, remaining neutral, not interfering in the civil war that had begun in the country, was all the Cossacks it didn’t work out. The peasantry at that stage can also be considered neutral, in the sense that the main part of it, having resolved the land issue one way or another during 1917, calmed down somewhat and was in no hurry to actively take anyone’s side. But if the opposing forces at that time had no time for the peasants, then they could not forget about the Cossacks. Thousands and tens of thousands of armed, military-trained people represented a force that was impossible not to take into account (in the fall of 1917, the army had 162 cavalry Cossack regiments, 171 separate hundreds and 24 foot battalions). The intense confrontation between the Reds and the Whites eventually reached the Cossack regions. First of all, this happened in the South and the Urals. The course of events was influenced by local conditions. Thus, the most fierce struggle was on the Don, where after October there was a mass exodus of anti-Bolshevik forces and, in addition, this region was closest to the center.

Both opposing sides actively tried to win the Cossacks over to them (or at least not to let them go to the enemy). There was active campaigning in word and deed. The Whites emphasized preserving liberties, Cossack traditions, identity, etc. The Reds - on the common goals of the socialist revolution for all working people, the comradely feelings of the Cossack front-line soldiers towards the soldiers. V.F. Mamonov drew attention to the similarity of elements of religious consciousness in the agitation of the Reds and Whites, as well as the methods of propaganda work 8. In general, neither one nor the other was sincere. Everyone was primarily interested in the combat potential of the Cossack troops.

In principle, the Cossacks definitely did not support anyone. There is no generalized data regarding how actively the Cossacks joined one or another camp. The Ural army rose almost completely, fielding 18 regiments (up to 10 thousand sabers) by November 1918. 9. The Orenburg Cossack army fielded nine regiments - by the fall of 1918 there were 10,904 Cossacks in the ranks. The conscription provided approximately 18% of the total number of combat-ready Cossacks of the Orenburg army 10. At the same time, in the fall of 1918, in the ranks of the Whites there were approximately 50 thousand Don and 35.5 thousand Kuban Cossacks 11.

According to V.F. Mamonov, in the Southern Urals in the spring of 1918, the 1st Soviet Orenburg Labor Cossack Regiment (up to 1000 people), five Red Cossack detachments in Troitsk (up to 500 people), detachments of I. and N. Kashirins were created in Verkhneuralsk (about 300 people). By the fall, there were more than 4 thousand Orenburg Cossacks on the Red side. 12 In September 1918, 14 Red Cossack regiments operated on the Southern Front. Note that we are talking about formations called regiments - but there is no exact data on the number of military personnel in them. By February 1919, there were 7 - 8 thousand Cossacks in the Red Army, united in 9 regiments. The report of the Cossack department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, compiled at the end of 1919, concluded that the Red Cossacks made up 20% of the total number, and from 70 to 80% of the Cossacks, for various reasons, were on the side of the whites 13.

This may sound somewhat paradoxical, but the neutrality of the Cossacks did not suit anyone. By the very force of circumstances, the Cossacks were doomed to participate in a fratricidal war 14.

The warring parties demanded a choice from the Cossacks: and in a word (“So know, whoever is not with us is against us. We need to finally agree: either go with us or take rifles and fight against us,” said the chairman of the Orenburg Military Revolutionary Committee S. Zwilling at the 1st Provincial Congress of Soviets on March 12, 1918 15) and in deed, trying to force the Cossacks to join the fight.

In conditions when the Cossacks were biding their time, the communists had a real chance to end the armed confrontation. Most of the Cossacks still preferred to remain neutral. However, stereotypes about Cossacks, political intolerance, and policy mistakes led to a crisis. It matured gradually, step by step. This is clearly seen in the events in the Orenburg region. In the first three days after the Red Guard entered Orenburg, several dozen villages declared recognition of Soviet power. But the Orenburg Bolsheviks did not seek dialogue with the Cossacks, demanding exclusively submission. The distribution of food detachments to the nearest villages led to the emergence of partisan “self-defense” detachments. On March 3, 1918, the Military Revolutionary Committee threatened that if “any village assists counter-revolutionary partisan detachments with shelter, shelter, food, etc., then such a village will be destroyed mercilessly by artillery fire.” 16. The threat was reinforced by the taking of hostages. On March 23, according to eyewitnesses, a real “hunt for Cossacks” began in the city. 17 Mass killings were committed solely for belonging to the Cossack class - these were mainly disabled, elderly, sick people. As a countermeasure - the destruction of several food detachments in the Cossack villages.

The next stage is the raid of partisan detachments on Orenburg on the night of April 3-4. The partisans held several streets for several hours, then retreated. Hatred, suspicion and fear arose again - as a result, reprisals against the Cossacks without trial began again. In Cossack Forstadt, lynchings continued for three days. Raids began in nearby villages, arrests of priests of Cossack parishes, executions of “hostile elements,” indemnities and requisitions. 19 villages were destroyed by artillery fire. The villages panicked. Protocols from villages about the desire to begin peace negotiations poured in. In the minutes of the general meeting Art. Kamenno-Ozernaya made a revealing remark: “we are between two fires” 18.

However, the communist authorities responded with another ultimatum, threatening “merciless red terror”: “Guilty villages” will be “indiscriminately swept away from the face of the earth” 19.

At the congress of the working Cossacks on May 8, the Cossacks raised a very acute question about the attitude towards them - “the Bolsheviks do not recognize us Cossacks”; “The word “Cossack” and settlements with an arrested person are short.” Numerous facts of violence against the Cossacks were cited. Those gathered demanded an end to unjustified arrests and executions, requisitions and confiscations. But even at the end of May, the provincial executive committee and the military-revolutionary headquarters adopted resolutions demanding an end to the ongoing lynchings and destruction of the villages. Such actions pushed the Cossacks away from the councils and pushed those who were wavering. Self-defense units became the basis of the KOMUCH army.

A similar situation took place on the Don: in the village of Veshenskaya at the end of 1918 there was an uprising against the whites. On the night of March 11, 1919, the uprising broke out again, this time due to dissatisfaction with the policies of the Bolsheviks.

Despite seemingly completely different goals, both sides acted using almost the same methods. At the beginning of 1918, Orenburg was under the control of the Reds for several months, then Ataman A. Dutov entered the city. The orders he established were surprisingly similar to the orders imposed by the communist authorities. Contemporaries noticed this almost immediately - an article appeared in the Menshevik newspaper “Narodnoe Delo” with the characteristic title “Bolshevism Inside Out” 20. Political opponents were immediately expelled from local authorities. Censorship has been introduced. Contributions were imposed: the communists demanded 110 million rubles from the Orenburg bourgeoisie, Pokrovskaya village - 500 thousand, three others - 560 thousand. Dutov - 200 thousand rubles. from suburban settlements and out-of-town residents of Cossack Forstadt. The institution of hostage-taking appeared: the Reds took from the “exploiting classes”, the Whites - “from candidates for future committees of the poor and commissars” 21. Arrests took place along class lines: the Reds arrested Cossacks and the bourgeoisie, the Whites - workers and for “active participation in a gang called themselves as Bolsheviks." Both sides easily violated the principles of traditional legality. Thus, Dutov’s “execution” order, announced on June 21, applied “to all crimes committed since January 18 of this year, i.e., from the day the Bolsheviks seized power in Orenburg” 22. The Red tribunals, in turn, relied on a “revolutionary sense of justice.”

It is symptomatic that the Cossacks who tried to conduct a dialogue with the authorities suffered equally from both. Almost immediately after the occupation of Orenburg by the Reds, a Cossack newspaper that was in opposition to Ataman Dutov was closed, and Cossacks who advocated dialogue with the Soviets were arrested. The executive committee of the Council of Cossack Deputies was dissolved. Later, these same people were repressed by Dutov.

The parties masked their weakness with threats. The Orenburg Military Revolutionary Committee addressed the Cossacks with an ultimatum, demanding that they “surrender their weapons” and “every harmful member of their members” within two days. For non-compliance, the headquarters threatened to shoot the villages with “artillery fire and shells and asphyxiating gases.” For the murder or attempt on the life of a Red Guard, they threatened to shoot the entire village: “for one - a hundred people.” In a new ultimatum a few days later, the headquarters again threatened with “merciless red terror” 23.

Another sign of weakness can be seen in the readiness with which the parties attributed their failures to the successes of the other side. The Bolsheviks increasingly became a kind of “bogeyman” with which the atamans intimidated the Cossacks in their own interests. Any disagreement with the ataman eventually began to be attributed to the influence of the Bolsheviks, as was the case, for example, in Orenburg with the 4th regiment. It was proposed to disband it, “as propagandized by the Bolsheviks,” although in fact the Cossacks of this regiment only made claims against Circle 24. The fact that the partisans who raided Orenburg on April 4, 1918, had white armbands was interpreted by the communists as a sign of the White Guard. The logic of the following reasoning: the white guard is the bourgeoisie, officers; therefore, the raid was carried out by Cossack officers, kulaks, etc. As a result, everything that happened was declared the act of Dutov, who had nothing to do with it.

Both sides hid their weakness in violence, quite demonstratively shifting the “blame” of individuals onto the entire village. Dutovites carried out reprisals against villages that did not submit to mobilization. M. Mashin cited evidence about Art. Klyuchevskaya, which “everyone was shot,” the town of Solodyanka, which “was all burned and destroyed” 25. V. Blucher’s troops acted similarly: under their pressure, the Cossacks retreated from the village of Donetskaya, followed by “Cossacks with their families” to neighboring peasant farms who did not take part." Nevertheless, Blucher reported, “having removed the remaining women and children from the village, for the uprising, increased damage to the route, the December uprising, the village was put on fire.”26 Executions became a mass phenomenon. During the two months that the directive was in effect, at least 260 Cossacks were shot on the Don. In the territories of the Ural and Orenburg troops, where there were white governments at that time, in Orenburg alone in January 1919, 250 Cossacks were shot for evading service in the white army.

Whether the Reds and Whites wanted it or not, the punitive measures of one side inevitably pushed the Cossacks to the side of their opponents. General I.G. Akulinin wrote: “The inept and cruel policy of the Bolsheviks, their undisguised hatred of the Cossacks, desecration of Cossack shrines, and especially bloody massacres, requisitions and indemnities and robberies in the villages - all this opened the eyes of the Cossacks to the essence of Soviet power and forced him to take up arms" 27. However, he kept silent about the fact that the whites acted in a similar way - and this also "opened the eyes of the Cossacks." Territories that had been under one government and had suffered hardships there, more strongly desired another in the hope of the best.

What did the Cossacks do when they found themselves between Bolshevism on the left and right? It turned out to be impossible to simply sit on the sidelines. If such a possibility still remained for the peasants - certain “bearish corners” were outside the combat zones and the reach of the warring parties, then for the Cossacks this was practically excluded - the fronts passed precisely through military territories.

Desertion can be considered a passive form of counteraction: evading mobilization, leaving the front. In conditions of civil war, when none of the authorities could clearly be considered legitimate, the content of the concept of “deserter” essentially changes. Each government - no matter “white” or “red” - proceeded from its “right of the strong” to carry out mobilizations. Hence, anyone who disobeyed became a deserter. It was force, violence, or the threat of it that was what kept those mobilized in the ranks of military formations. And as the government weakened and began to suffer defeats and setbacks, the flow of fugitives from its ranks increased. It’s a paradox, but both the whites and the reds, often proclaiming diametrically opposed slogans, agreed on one thing - in assessing the peasants and Cossacks as potential cannon fodder, from which they can endlessly draw reinforcements for themselves.

Desertion for the Cossacks was a new phenomenon - betrayal of oath and duty was always condemned. A.I. Denikin wrote that during the World War the Cossacks, unlike all other components of the army, did not know desertion. Now desertion became widespread and enjoyed clear support from the population. The village residents voluntarily supplied the deserters with food, fodder, horses, and, in addition to all this, sheltered them. The data that has reached us on the number of deserters is fragmentary and does not allow us to give a complete picture of the phenomenon. In the Cossack villages there were from 10 to 100 people in each 28. The bulk of the deserters were those who expected to sit out until better times. In fact, it was about the reluctance of peasants to fight in the ranks of any army, as well as their reluctance to leave their farm for a long time. According to the security officers, in the Cossack villages of the Orenburg province, deserters organized open meetings where they decided not to appear in unit 29.

To combat deserters, round-ups were widely used - in the documentation of Soviet officials this was called “pumping out.” In some areas they were done almost every day, but still did not achieve success. Raids often turned into local fighting. Many deserters were armed, and with an unwillingness to surrender and resistance, the punitive detachments sought to simply destroy them.

Another way was to evade service - the number of refusals was constantly increasing, attempts to evade by refusing the Cossack rank became common. A special order was issued for the Orenburg army, according to which “the Cossacks expelled from the Orenburg army were transferred to a prisoner of war camp without any investigation or trial” 30.

Since the end of 1918, refusals to conduct military operations and mass defections to the side of the Red Army became frequent occurrences. Winter 1918 - 1919 Nine Ural regiments refused to fight, one regiment (7th) went over to the Red side. In May 1919, Kolchak ordered the disbandment of the Separate Orenburg Army due to the loss of its last combat capability.

Cossack partisan “self-defense” units, which began to be created in the villages, for defense against any external threat, became a special form of counteraction. They were mainly made up of reserve Cossacks and non-serving youth. The simplified bipolar scheme of the balance of power in the civil war, which dominated Russian literature for decades, inevitably assigned the Cossack partisans to one of the camps. The Orenburg partisans, who opposed the requisitions of the red detachments, began to be perceived as “white”; Cossack detachments (including F. Mironov) who met the whites on the way to the Volga in the summer of 1918 - “red”. However, everything was much more complicated: for example, one of the detachments of the Orenburg Cossacks in 1918 was commanded by Popov, who later, in 1921, joined with his detachment in the performance of the red commander T. Vakulin 31.

It is natural to pose the question - what was the position of the bulk of the Cossacks? Of course, the Cossack class, already at the beginning of the twentieth century, was not that single community, the legends about which were actively supported by interested forces. The stratification penetrated deeper and deeper into the Cossack environment, the interests of various groups in certain issues reached the point of antagonism. These contradictions were caused not so much by differences in property, but by attitudes towards the war. Naturally, there were extremists on the right and on the left, but it can hardly be said that they were the ones who determined the overall picture. Although, in principle, everyone wanted to consider themselves spokesmen for the views of the entire Cossacks. The position of the Cossacks, of course, was somewhat adjusted under the influence of external factors. And at the same time, it remained unchanged at its core.

The views of the peasantry and the Cossacks had a lot in common. In principle, it seems to us, the Cossacks, as an agricultural population, just like the peasantry, were concerned about two important issues: “land and freedom.” The comparison, of course, is conditional - both elements of this formula in relation to the peasantry and the Cossacks are filled with a slightly different content. However, for the peasantry in different periods they sounded differently.

The question of land was as acute for the Cossacks as for the peasants. Although there was a fundamental difference: the latter were looking for where to find the missing land, the Cossacks were looking for ways to preserve the land they already had.

The rise of the so-called We observe “anti-Soviet” protests by the Cossacks in the spring of 1918, when the agrarian policy of the Soviet government forces the masses of the Cossacks to abandon “neutralism.” Firstly, these were the actions of food detachments, the attitude of the Cossacks and the peasantry towards which was equally hostile. But land legislation became a much more serious factor. The option proposed by the communist government for resolving the land issue at the expense of Cossack territories, in principle, excluded the possibility of any union of farmers and drove a wedge between forces that could potentially become a decisive factor in the fate of the country. The Decree on Land and, to an even greater extent, the Basic Law on Socialization (January 27, 1918) found a response primarily among the peasantry. The Cossacks received nothing from them. Moreover, according to the law on socialization, it lost plots previously leased to peasants. On the Don and Kuban, the discontent of the Cossacks could be somehow neutralized by the transfer of officer's allotments to ordinary Cossacks, but in the troops of the eastern regions there were either no such allotments at all, or they were small (on average 5.2%). In the spring of 1918, for the first time on a significant scale, attempts were made locally to redistribute land by confiscating it from the Cossacks. The uprisings of the spring of 1918 were not so much an uprising against Soviet power as a struggle for land.

The split between the Cossacks and the peasantry became noticeable from the beginning of the twentieth century. The shortage of land, the better land supply of the Cossacks, and the government’s more favorable policies towards them aroused the hostility of the peasants, because it contradicted their concepts of justice. During the revolution of 1905 - 1907. Left propagandists specifically emphasized the confrontation between the Cossacks and peasants. Their rivalry intensified even more during the years of the Stolypin reform, especially after the law of December 4, 1913 allowed the Cossacks to acquire privately owned lands through the mediation of a peasant bank, not only on military territory, but also beyond its borders. Let us note that in 1917, military circles hastened to secure military lands for the Cossacks.

The white governments made their “contribution” by clearing the territory of the army from the “undesirable” population, as was done, for example, in the Orenburg army 32. In the territory controlled by KOMUCH, the forced return of landowners’ property with the help of Cossack detachments became a widespread phenomenon. The Orenburg Cossacks, who did not want to fight on the common front of KOMUCH, were eventually recruited primarily for punitive functions, maintaining order, etc. The Cossacks regained a noticeably privileged position. The rather traditional hostility between the Cossacks and peasants acquired a “new breath”. The head of the Orenburg provincial propaganda cultural and educational department in his report dated November 9, 1918 to the central department stated: “The Cossack population sharply separates itself from the non-Cossacks... the Cossacks make up those partisan detachments that carry out punitive executions, restore landownership, and arrest land agents committees, are restoring the peasantry against the Constituent Assembly... and pushing the peasantry into the arms of the Bolsheviks" 33. The gap between the Cossacks and the peasantry became wider and wider.

The concept of “will” for the Cossacks ultimately resulted in the desire to preserve their identity, broad self-government, and support for the ideas of Cossack autonomy. This idea, as they say, has been in the air for quite some time. After the fall of the autocracy, the idea of ​​transforming the troops into something between a simple administrative-territorial unit and a national autonomous territory was born among the Cossack leaders. At that stage, without raising the question of secession from Russia, without raising the topic of creating a “Cossack” statehood, they talked about sovereignty, i.e. absolute power within the army. The process of some separation from the rest of Russia took place at different times among different troops. Thus, on the Don, a Cossack government was created on May 26, 1917. The Ural Cossack army began talking about the complete separation of the territory of the Ural Cossacks from the Ural region in September, while simultaneously raising the question of renaming the army (to Yaitskoye). The separation (or, more correctly, isolation) of the territory of the Orenburg Cossack army from the rest of the province was already an accomplished reality by December 1917.

Until the beginning of 1918, the separation of the Cossack regions was considered by the atamans as a forced, temporary measure, until the convening of the Constituent Assembly. However, A. Dutov already in the fall of 1917 spoke about the creation of a Cossack federation to preserve Cossack identity. The leaders of the Cossack troops, as the revolutionary crisis intensified, placed more and more hopes on expanding autonomy, until finally the ataman of the Don Army A.M. Kaledin proclaimed the slogan of creating a South-Eastern Union of Cossacks of the Don, Terek, Kuban, Astrakhan, Orenburg and Ural troops, as well as mountaineers of the Caucasus. Dutov stated that the Cossacks should consider themselves a special nation.

Different political forces, at different stages, put different content into the concept of autonomy.

The broad Cossack masses understood autonomy in their own way, without strictly linking its existence with the Constituent Assembly. Thus, the Cossack section of the Chelyabinsk district congress of peasants and Cossack deputies approved the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on February 17, concluding that “in the decree recognizing Russia as a federal Soviet republic... there is a guarantee that our identity and historical rights will be preserved...” 34 The significant majority of the Cossacks did not want to support Dutov in his confrontation, and therefore were ready for dialogue with the Soviet government, of course, subject to certain guarantees of maintaining Cossack autonomy. The idea, which at the initial stage was the product of the Cossack elite, begins to win more and more supporters among the Cossacks. Autonomy became a kind of guarantor against the non-proliferation of Soviet power and military-communist measures. (This is exactly how they understood their autonomy in Bashkurdistan.) Evidence from the field is indicative: in the order to the deputies of Art. Razsypnaya spoke about the need to achieve complete autonomy for the territory of the army - “relative to the rest of the territory of the Orenburg province and the introduction of Soviet power in it, this does not concern us.” 35. The title of the article in “Cossack Pravda” is even more expressive: “Do what you want, but don’t bother us " 36.

The fierce battles of January - April, the successes of the spring - summer of 1918 strengthened the separatist demands. On August 12, the OKW Military Government published a decree according to which it declared “the territory of the Orenburg Army a special part of the Russian State” and decided to henceforth call it the “Region of the Orenburg Army.” At the beginning of March 1918, the Ural region was declared completely autonomous.

The broad Cossack masses, apparently, understood autonomy, first of all, as a guarantee of the inviolability of their territory. They stubbornly refused to go beyond its limits. Thus, the Urals took the most massive part in the white movement. But for a long time they also adhered to the decision put forward at the beginning of 1918 - “We will not go beyond the border.” Under Dutov, the Orenburg Cossacks did not go beyond the military territory - “limited themselves to placing guard pickets on the borders of their possessions” 37. This was observed later: in 1920 - 1921. Cossack “armies” literally circled in certain areas, not wanting to go far from their native villages.

Cossack autonomy (both in the “ataman” and “people’s” versions) in principle did not suit anyone. The White movement advocated for a “united and indivisible Russia,” which is why Kolchak eventually agreed to transfer powers to the atamans only to resolve issues of internal management of the Cossacks. The communists, who supported this idea for tactical reasons, ultimately stubbornly held on to the extension of the RSFSR constitution, which did not mention Cossack autonomy, to the entire territory of the country.

Among other fundamental points, it should be noted the attitude to the form of government. In principle, all Cossack troops spoke out regarding the form of government already in the summer of 1917, when military circles spoke out for the republic. V. Lenin either did not have information, or deliberately distorted reality, judging by his statement, regarding the Don Cossacks, “after 1905, they remained as monarchical as before...” 38 Almost immediately after February, democratic rule was introduced in all Cossack regions self-government, and this initiative found the broadest support among the Cossacks.

The issue of “decossackization” is especially important. It is important to clarify what is meant by this. Probably, we should talk about the elimination of the special class status of the Cossacks. It is significant that they started talking about decossackization almost immediately after February - both by liberals, who proposed eliminating both the rights and responsibilities of the Cossacks, and by the Cossacks themselves. Already in the spring of 1917, at congresses of the Cossacks there were calls for the liquidation of the class. Naturally, we were talking about eliminating, first of all, the duties of the service. But there was another approach: to equalize the Cossacks with the peasants in the use of land. The communists refused to recognize the specialness of the Cossacks - the First All-Russian Congress of Labor Cossacks at the beginning of 1920 stated that “the Cossacks are by no means a special nationality or nation, but constitute an integral part of the Russian people, therefore there is no talk of any separation of the Cossack regions from the rest of Soviet Russia, what the Cossack elite, closely united with the landowners and the bourgeoisie, are striving for is out of the question." 39. Within the framework of this approach, the Cossack structures of self-government were eliminated, and at the same time all manifestations of originality. Since 1920, there has been a campaign to rename the villages into volosts. In 1921 in Orenburg province. The act of disobedience in one of the villages was manifested in the demonstrative wearing of trousers with stripes and caps with cockades. All that V. Lenin casually called “archaic survivals familiar to the population” 40 was much more for many, and the ban - not a gradual withering away, but a violent ban - was perceived extremely painfully. The Cossack desire to preserve tradition was interpreted as an intention to maintain a special, chosen position. There is no doubt that social stratification had already penetrated quite deeply into the Cossack environment, but still the idea of ​​Cossack unity was stronger, it remained a cementing principle.

It seems to us that it would not be entirely correct to say that by ultimately taking either side, the Cossacks thereby unambiguously became red or white. The explanations traditionally accepted in Soviet literature for the unconditional transition of the “laboring Cossacks” to the side of the Reds as a result of the propaganda activities of the communists and “kulaks” to the side of the Whites extremely simplify the complex picture. Cossacks fight not so much for anyone, but against them. Cossack units in all white armies retain some isolation: the Samara KOMUCH was never able to force the Orenburg Cossacks to actively participate in hostilities, limiting themselves to police functions. The removal of hostile forces from the territory almost immediately entailed a decline in military activity. General I.G. Akulinin stated with annoyance: “after the expulsion of the Bolsheviks from the Cossack land, the enthusiasm of the Cossacks immediately fell; there was a desire to go home, especially since the time had come for haymaking and harvesting; Many Cossacks, out of myopia, considered the Bolsheviks completely defeated; some looked at the struggle outside the territory of the Army as a matter that did not concern them (emphasized by us - D.S.)” 41.

At the beginning of 1919, there was a crisis in the White Cossack movement, growing dissatisfaction with the hardships of the war and the policies of the White governments. Economic difficulties in the territories of the Cossack troops are becoming catastrophic. Most of the troops were in the war zone, the movement of the front from east to west and back aggravated the devastation 42. As the white armies left military territories, the outflow of Cossacks from them increased. In our opinion, mass defections to the Red side are not the result of an ideological choice, but simply a return home. Those who left Russia and emigrated were primarily those for whom there was no way back. The rest tried to adapt to the new conditions. Establishment of the so-called in Cossack territories. “Soviet power”, and in fact the power of the Communist Party, made the most pressing question about the relationship between the party and the Cossacks.

It should be recognized that the communist leadership had an unambiguous attitude towards the Cossacks, seeing in them, first of all, “the support of the throne and reaction.” L. Trotsky spoke out with exceptional hostility, asserting on the pages of “Cossack Truth” that the Cossacks “always played the role of executioner, pacifier and servant of the imperial house.” “A Cossack,” he continued further, “... is a person of little intelligence, a liar, and one cannot trust him... one has to notice the similarities between the psychology of the Cossacks and the psychology of some representatives of the zoological world.” 43. I. Stalin treated the Cossacks with hostility and distrust. Indicative is his letter to V. Lenin from Tsaritsyn on August 4, 1918, accusing F. Mironov of defeats, blaming the latter on the “Cossack troops” who “cannot, do not want” to fight the “Cossack counter-revolution” 44. And, between However, in fact, Mironov’s troops held Tsaritsyn. Stalin called the Cossacks “the original weapon of Russian imperialism,” which has long been exploiting “non-Russian peoples on the outskirts,” on the pages of Pravda in December 1919. 45 However, V. Lenin was not free from prejudice: “On the Southern Front... a nest undoubtedly the counter-revolutionary Cossacks, who after 1905 remained as monarchical as before...” 46 Such assessments were typical of a significant part of the communist leadership and were decisive in the policies pursued. Distrust of the Cossacks was observed at all stages of the civil war. It seems to us symptomatic that after F. Mironov’s speech, the Cossack Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was accused of involvement in it, whose files were sealed 47.

The communists placed themselves outside the rest of society, or rather, above it. The party leadership demanded that ordinary party members be intransigent towards all enemies, and everyone who disagreed in any way with the line of the RCP(b) became such. The communists were characterized by an amazing conviction that only they, their party, knew the right path to happiness, only they did the right thing. This approach initially deprived this party of allies and excluded an equal dialogue with anyone, especially with the peasantry and Cossacks. Everyone else had to be led along with him - in party documents one often encounters words about the political backwardness of the masses, the “backward Don”, etc. The agricultural population had to be “split”, and also “remade for a long time and with great difficulty and great hardships” 48. There was a rigid imposition of new rules, values, criteria - obviously a complete disregard for the traditions and habits of both the Russian village and the Cossack village. An ally could only be someone who unconditionally accepted both the political line of the communists and their leadership. There is no third option - as noted in the report of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), “there can be no middle policy on the Don between the Denikin reaction and the workers’ revolution” 49. This was said in relation to the speech of F. Mironov, whose slogans were called the “illusion of democracy”: “Against the communists (i.e. against the dictatorship of the revolutionary class), in defense of democracy (under the guise of “people's”, i.e. inter-class councils), against the death penalty (i.e. against harsh measures against oppressors and agents) and so on, and so on.” 50

We must admit: the Communist Party fought with the Cossacks (we think the phrase in the Central Committee report for October 1919, which said that the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkfront declared an amnesty “to all Orenburg Cossacks who surrendered to our party”), was very indicative. All statements that the Cossacks (“the bulk of the Cossacks”) are considered by the party “as possible allies and friends” are nothing more than propaganda slogans.

The course towards “decossackization”, which began as the elimination of class barriers and duties of the Cossacks (decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars “On the destruction of classes and civil ranks” of November 11, 1917, resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of December 9, 1917, abolishing compulsory military service of the Cossacks), gradually acquired a different, more sinister content - the extermination of the Cossacks and their dissolution in the peasant environment. Quite often this is associated with the directive of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) dated January 24, 1919, which demanded that “the most merciless struggle be waged against all the top of the Cossacks through their wholesale extermination. No compromises...are allowed.” Merciless mass terror was to be carried out against all Cossacks “who took any direct or indirect part in the fight against Soviet power.” It was necessary to carry out complete disarmament, “shooting everyone who is found with a weapon after the deadline for surrender” 51. The instruction issued as a follow-up to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front on February 7 demanded to “immediately shoot” “all without exception” Cossacks who held elected positions, all officers of the Krasnov army, all figures of the counter-revolution, “all rich Cossacks without exception,” who were found with weapons. As a result, the situation on the Don-Kuban and Ural-Orenburg fronts sharply worsened 52.

On the territory of the Orenburg army, the directive was not implemented - the region was controlled by the Whites. However, there are facts of its use by whites for propaganda purposes. All this led to the loss of the Orenburg-Ural region and the Cossack uprisings. On March 16, 1919, the plenum of the Central Committee decided that “in view of the obvious split between the northern and southern Cossacks on the Don,” “we are suspending the adoption of measures against the Cossacks.”53 This decision was not at all an admission of error - it was simply “suspended.” Locally they ignored this and continued the previous course. So, the next day, March 17, the Revolutionary Military Council of the 8th Army directly demanded: “All Cossacks who raised arms in the rear of the Red troops must be completely destroyed, and all those who have anything to do with the uprising and the anti-Soviet agitation, not stopping at the percentage destruction of the population of the villages...” 54 As a consequence, the successful breakthrough of Denikin’s troops in May 1919 in the Millerovo area and the joining of the rebels.

It is common for Soviet historians and a certain part of today’s Russian historians to focus attention on the decrees of the Soviet government, party documents, analyzing the policies of the Communists towards the Cossacks on their basis. Of course, they are the source, but the picture created on their basis is ideal - the reality was noticeably different. When examined comprehensively, what is striking is the ease of course correction - sometimes to the diametrically opposite direction. What some authors believe was a correction of “mistakes” made was, in fact, just a tactic. Actually, this also includes consent to Cossack autonomy - a rather important and painful issue for the Cossacks.

The policy was quite ambivalent. The communist government seemed to recognize the Cossacks' desire for autonomy. The address of the Second Congress of Soviets expressed the idea of ​​​​the need to create councils of Cossack deputies everywhere 55. At the same time, the Cossack department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was created. At first, being weak and in need of help, the communists were inclined to support the idea of ​​autonomy - for example, in January 1918, Lenin declared: “I have nothing against the autonomy of the Don region.” 56. The Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets in January proclaimed Russia a Federal Republic. Since the IV Congress, it has become a congress of “Cossack” deputies. In the spring of 1918, the Council of People's Commissars issued a “Decree on the organization of administration of Cossack regions,” which noted that all Cossack regions and troops “are considered as separate administrative units of local Soviet associations, i.e. like provinces." As a result, in March - April 1918, the Don, Terek, Kuban-Black Sea republics existed. The decree of June 1, 1918 secured broad autonomy for the Cossack regions. In the period from October 1917 to May 1918 (a period of noticeable weakness), the communists stood for autonomy for the Cossack regions. By the fall of 1918, a revision of policy began: on September 30, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee decided to liquidate the Don Republic. As soon as the situation on the fronts changed for the better, there was a slight abandonment of their own guarantees. Local Cossack bodies of self-government were destroyed - instead of them, revolutionary committees were created, in some places centrally. Thus, after the Reds returned to Orenburg in April 1919, the Gubrevkom decided to introduce revolutionary committees in the Cossack regions, and Soviets in civilian territory.

Revolutionary committees were characterized by appointment, coercion, and control. The temporary regulations on village revolutionary committees required them to organize, under the threat of a tribunal, the surrender of military property, including even pouches, binoculars, and saddles. The revolutionary committees were required to “delimit the entire male population of a given village, keep records of the White Guard Cossacks and the Red Army Cossacks, compiling lists of them.” 57 But when mobilization began in October, an order appeared from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkfront, promising to replace the revolutionary committees with authorities elected by the population. When in April 1919 in Orenburg they tried to create a Cossack executive committee for Cossack autonomy, they were strictly stopped by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The telegram signed by Ya. Sverdlov clearly stated: “In each point there must be a single authority” 58. In fact, the Cossacks were not allowed to create their own power - only the option formulated by P. Kobozev, the authorized representative of the center, was allowed: “My instructions for order the formation of a new Cossack council through the committee of the poor, comma of the communist cell, comma through the full implementation of the class food Soviet policy” 59.

The final point on the issue can be considered the decree of the Council of People's Commissars “On the construction of Soviet power in the Cossack regions,” which in 1920 directly set the task of “establishing general bodies of Soviet power in the Cossack regions” on the basis of the Constitution of the RSFSR. Soon, by a special resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, all general laws on land management, land use, and forests were extended to the former Cossack regions.

The situation was similar regarding the conscription of Cossacks, giving them the opportunity to fight for Soviet power. In the Southern Urals, where Dutov shamefully fled at the beginning of 1918, there was no need for Cossacks. On February 1, 1918, the Orenburg Military Revolutionary Committee demanded that the OKW Provisional Council cancel the mobilization - because by decree of the Council of People's Commissars “all Cossack units were disbanded” 60. On the Don, the situation was different, and on May 30, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars called on the “labor Cossacks of the Don and Kuban” to take arms 61. New decrees should be considered a consequence of the crisis of early 1918: the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of On June 1, 1918, “On the organization of management of the Cossack regions” already provided for the possibility of forming units of the revolutionary army, and the decree of June 11 announced the mobilization of the Siberian and Orenburg troops on the territory of the 62.

The determining factor in that period was the activity of communists on the ground. F. Mironov quite rightly noted in a letter to V. Lenin on July 31, 1919: “The majority of the peasants judge Soviet power by its executors.” 63. A hundred humane decrees were easily crossed out in the minds of people with one lawless execution. The position of the local communists was much tougher and more consistent - for the most part they refused to recognize the Cossacks as having any special status, much less autonomy. The reason for such hostility, in our opinion, lay in the stereotypes rooted in the minds of the peasants, who always believed that the Cossacks were in a privileged position and were envious of this, and city residents, workers, who imagined the Cossacks as a monolithic reactionary force, the support of the old regime - in the orders and addresses, there are repeated references to the “Cossack whip” that “walked” on the backs of the working people, “the centuries-old enemies of the working people,” “the centuries-old royal slaves.” The Orenburg Provincial Congress of Soviets in March 1918 declared that “all Cossacks are against Soviet power” 64.

The Donburo took an extremely hostile and irreconcilable position, repeatedly raising the question of the destruction “through a number of measures... of the kulak Cossacks as an estate.” The January directive found support in the Ural Cossack Army, in the territory controlled by the Communists - the so-called. The “left” Urals stood for the extermination of the Cossacks. Calls to destroy the Cossacks were heard at the Chelyabinsk district party conference in August 1919, and the Orenburg provincial party conference in November.

Perhaps, of all the local party structures, it was the Donburo that most openly formulated its positions. The decision, adopted no later than April 21, 1919, spoke of “the complete, rapid and decisive destruction of the Cossacks as a special everyday economic group, the destruction of its economic foundations, the physical destruction of the Cossack bureaucracy and officers, in general all the top of the Cossacks, actively counter-revolutionary, dispersal and neutralization of ordinary Cossacks and the formal liquidation of the Cossacks” 65.

It is wrong to think that contemporaries did not understand the meaning of what was happening. F. Mironov, in a letter to V. Lenin on July 31, 1919, directly called such an idea a plan for the destruction of the Cossacks: “They need to go back and forth through the Cossack regions and, under the guise of pacifying artificially caused uprisings, depopulate the Cossack regions, proletarianize, ruin the remnants of the population and, settling then the landless, begin the construction of a “communist paradise” 66.

The implementation of the military-communist experiment in the “Soviet” territories, burdened by stereotypes of hostile attitude towards the Cossacks, quickly led to a break. An important element of the policy was the implementation of economic terror aimed at the economic bleeding of the Cossacks. As part of the “de-Cossackization”, lands were confiscated from the Cossacks - so, in the territory of the Orenburg Cossack Army alone, about 400 thousand dessiatines were transferred to the peasants and the poor. arable land and 400 thousand hayfields. The well-known directive of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) of January 24, 1919, calling for terror, among other things, demanded the confiscation of agricultural products from the Cossacks and the encouragement of resettlement of the poor 67.

The surplus appropriation system played a special role. And no matter how the communist ideologists tried to cover up what was happening with elegant constructions about the thoughtful seizure of “surplus” with subsequent compensation to farmers, in fact it all came down to the seizure of everything that the food contractors got their hands on. They took it where they could take it and where they had time to take it. There was no talk of any justice. Voluntariness did not guarantee against consequences; rather, on the contrary, more was taken from the obedient. According to the instructions, only “surplus” was allowed to be “requisitioned” from those who voluntarily surrendered, while complete confiscation was allowed from those who disobeyed. Logically, it turned out that it was even more profitable for food detachments to deal with enemies and provoke the Cossacks to resist. The size of the allocation was constantly growing, gradually the concept of “surplus” became quite conditional - the circular letter of the Central Committee “Towards the Food Campaign” explained that “the allocation given to the volost is already in itself a definition of surplus” 68. By 1921, the farms of the producing strip were renting out up to 92% of the produced product 69.

The final blow to the Cossacks was the famine of 1921-1922. It cannot be considered provoked, but at a certain stage it was used to “cleanse” unnecessary “human material of the capitalist era” (N. Bukharin). One got the impression that this was also used to fight peasant uprisings - the rebels received food and other aid from the local population, and in starving areas it was very difficult for them to find help, they had to leave. It was also a covert repression against the population supporting the rebels. Thus, the Cossack population of the Iletsk district of the Orenburg province actively assisted the rebels in 1920. Then an almost absolute “pumping” of food was carried out (the villages handed over 120% of bread, 240% of meat) - fearing punishment, the population chose to submit. But when famine broke out, the residents of the villages did not receive any help from the authorities. Moreover, in September 1921, leaving the area was prohibited - as a result, a huge mortality rate was observed. A similar situation was in the neighboring Samara province, where Pugachevsky and Buzuluksky districts in 1920 - 1921. were perhaps the most explosive. At the beginning of 1922, there were even cases of cannibalism.

In 1920 - 1922 A wave of peasant uprisings is rising throughout the country, caused by the policies pursued by the communists. Protests against it have taken various forms, from grievances to unrest and insurrection. In order for the civilian population to rise up in arms against the newly established government, some time must pass - a certain period is necessary, during which there is a kind of acquaintance with the power and an attempt to get used to it. The impossibility of normal coexistence ultimately becomes a decisive factor. The protests of the Cossack population against the surplus appropriation system during this period seemed to dissolve into the general peasant protest and is quite difficult to isolate them from the overall picture, especially since, in essence, they were similar.

The active insurgent actions of the newly created Cossack partisan detachments stand apart. All of them were, as a rule, small in number, uniting a maximum of several hundred people. Weakness required a search for allies - which is why the commanders of these units constantly sought contacts with each other. Basically, such groups did not have a permanent base, being in constant motion. Their actions, which consisted of raids on populated areas and the extermination of “enemies” there, inevitably led to the curtailment of propaganda activities. The ideological positions of the rebels were stated extremely sparingly; one can say without exaggeration that the fight against the communists was put at the forefront. All these detachments were already beginning to balance on the line that separated the ideological opponents of the communist regime from the bandits fighting against everyone and everything. Their tragedy lay in the impossibility of returning to peaceful life - the road back was blocked by both the mutual unwillingness to compromise and the already shed blood. The fact that victory was now out of the question was obvious to everyone. The resistance of small groups of rebels was the resistance of the doomed.

In the south, such detachments operated in the period 1920 - 1922. So. in July 1920, near Maykop, M. Fostikov created the Cossack “Russian Revival Army”. In Kuban, no earlier than October 1920, the so-called The 1st detachment of the Russian Partisan Army under the command of M.N. Zhukov, which existed until the spring of 1921. Since 1921, he also headed the “White Cross Organization,” which had underground cells in the north-west of Kuban. At the end of 1921 - beginning of 1922 on the border of the Voronezh province. and the Upper Don District there was a detachment of Cossack Yakov Fomin, the former commander of a cavalry squadron of the Red Army. In the first half of 1922, all these detachments were finished.

In the region bounded by the Volga and the Urals, there were a large number of small Cossack groups, the existence of which was limited mainly to 1921. They were characterized by constant movement: either to the north - to Saratov province, or to the south - to the Ural region. Passing along the borders of both counties and provinces, the rebels for some time seemed to fall out of the control of the security officers, “showing up” in a new place. These groups sought to unite. They received significant reinforcements from the Orenburg Cossacks, and young people at that. In April, the previously independent groups of Sarafankin and Safonov merged. After a series of defeats on September 1, the detachment joined Aistov’s detachment, which most likely arose in the Ural region back in 1920 on the initiative of several Red Army front-line soldiers. In October 1921, a number of previously disparate partisan detachments finally united, merging with Serov’s “Rising Troops of the Will of the People.”

To the east, in the Trans-Urals (mainly within the Chelyabinsk province), partisan detachments operated mainly in 1920. In September - October, the so-called. “Green Army” by Zvedin and Zvyagintsev. In mid-October, security officers in the area of ​​the village of Krasnenskaya discovered an organization of local Cossacks, which supplied weapons and food to deserters. In November, a similar organization of Cossacks arose in the village of Krasinsky, Verkhneuralsky district. The rebel groups are gradually being fragmented. The Cheka reports for the second half of 1921 constantly mentioned “small gangs of bandits” in the region.

The Cossacks of Siberia and the Far East acted later, since Soviet power was established there only in 1922. The Cossack partisan movement reached its scale in 1923 - 1924. This region is characterized by a special moment - the intervention in the events of Cossack detachments of the former White armies, who went abroad and are now moving over to the Soviet side. The insurgency here was over by 1927.

The most important indicator, in our opinion, of the crisis of the policies pursued by the communists was the period of uprisings under the red banner and Soviet slogans. Cossacks and peasants act together. The basis of the rebel forces were Red Army units. All the actions had similar features and were even interconnected to some extent: in July 1920, the 2nd Cavalry Division stationed in the Buzuluk area under the command of A. Sapozhkov rebelled, declaring itself the “First Red Army of Truth”; in December 1920 he led the performance in the song. Mikhailovskaya K. Vakulin (the so-called Vakulin-Popov detachment); in the spring of 1921, from a part of the Red Army located in the Buzuluk district to suppress the “rebellions of kulak gangs” (consequences of the activities of the “Army of Truth” there), the “First People's Revolutionary Army” of Okhranyuk-Chersky arose; in the fall of 1921, the Orlov-Kurilovsky regiment rebelled, calling itself the “Ataman division of the rebel [troops] groups of the will of the people,” commanded by one of Sapozhkov’s former commanders, V. Serov.

All the leaders of these rebel forces were combat commanders and had awards: K. Vakulin previously commanded the 23rd regiment of the Mironov division, awarded the Order of the Red Banner; A. Sapozhkov was the organizer of the defense of Uralsk from the Cossacks, for which he received a gold watch and personal gratitude from Trotsky. The main combat zone is the Volga region: from the Don regions to the Ural River, Orenburg. There was some rejection of the locality of the actions - the Orenburg Cossacks make up a significant part of Popov's rebels in the Volga region, the Ural Cossacks - among Serov. At the same time, suffering defeats from communist troops, the rebels always tried to retreat to the areas where these units were formed, the native lands of the majority of the rebels. The Cossacks brought elements of organization into the rebellion, playing the same role that they played earlier in the previous peasant wars - they created a combat-ready core.

The slogans and appeals of the rebels indicate that, while opposing the communists, they did not abandon the idea itself. Thus, A. Sapozhkov believed that “the policy of the Soviet government, together with the Communist Party, in its three-year course, went far to the right of the policy and declaration of rights that were put forward in October 1917” 71. The Serovites were already talking about slightly different ideals - about establishing the power of the people “themselves” “according to the principle of the great February Revolution.” But at the same time they declared that they were not against communism as such, “recognizing communism as a great future and its sacred idea.” 72. Democracy was also mentioned in K. Vakulin’s appeals.

All these speeches were labeled “anti-Soviet” for many years. Meanwhile, it should be admitted that they were “pro-Soviet”. In the sense that they advocated the Soviet form of government. The slogan “Soviets without communists” by and large does not carry with it the criminality that has been attributed to it for decades. In fact, the Soviets were supposed to be organs of power of the masses, not of parties. Perhaps these speeches should have been called “anti-communist”, again taking into account their slogans. However, the scale of the protests does not mean at all that the Cossack and peasant masses were against the course of the RCP(b). When speaking out against the communists, the Cossacks and peasants, first of all, had in mind “their” locals - it was the actions of specific individuals that were the reason for each action.

The uprisings of the Red Army were suppressed with exceptional cruelty - for example, 1500 people. Okhranyuk’s surrendered “people’s army soldiers” were mercilessly cut down with sabers 73 for several days.

The city of Orenburg during this period can be considered as a kind of border. To the west, its population mainly supported the Soviet form of government, most of the measures of the Soviet government, protesting only against their “distortion” and blaming the communists for this. The main force of the rebel troops are Cossacks and peasants. To the east there were also performances, mainly in the Chelyabinsk province. These, almost entirely Cossack in composition, loudly called themselves “armies”, were quite disciplined, had all or almost all the mandatory attributes of real military formations - headquarters, banner, orders, etc. An important difference was the conduct of printed campaigning - they all published and distributed appeals. In the summer of 1920, the Blue National Army of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, the First People's Army, and the Green Army emerged. Around the same time, a detachment of S. Vydrin arose, declaring himself “the military commander of the free Orenburg Cossacks.” An analysis of the slogans and statements of the rebel Cossacks of the Chelyabinsk province (“Down with Soviet power”, “Long live the Constituent Assembly”) shows that in the eastern regions the population wanted to live more traditionally. In the occupied villages, the bodies of Soviet power were liquidated and atamans were again elected - as a provisional government. In policy statements, the power of the Soviets and the power of the Communists are interpreted as something unified. The call to fight for the power of the Constituent Assembly, which, most likely, was perceived as the antithesis of the power of the Soviets - a more legitimate power, had a wide spread and response among the masses.

It seems significant to us that the communist government always used lies in relation to dissenting allies. In not a single case were the true causes of the conflict revealed. Any protests against the communists were interpreted by the latter solely as a manifestation of unhealthy ambitions and so on. - but they never admitted their own mistakes. Accused of rebellion in 1919, F. Mironov was literally slandered. Trotsky’s leaflet said: “What was the reason for Mironov’s temporary accession to the revolution? Now this is completely clear: personal ambition, careerism, the desire to rise up on the backs of the working masses.” 74. Both A. Sapozhkov and Okhranyuk were accused of excessive ambition and adventurism.

Distrust of the Cossacks also extended to the Cossack leaders. The policy in relation to them can be defined in one word - use. Actually, this cannot be assumed to be some kind of special attitude towards the Cossacks - the communists behaved similarly towards all allies - the Bashkir leaders led by Validov, Dumenko and others. An indicative entry is in the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on October 15, 1919: “To request the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-East Front and the Don Executive Committee about ways to use the antagonism of the Donets and Kubans with Denikin for military-political purposes (the use of Mironov)” 75. The fate of F. Mironov is generally typical for Cossack commander: at the stage of active struggle for Soviet power he was not even awarded - he never received the order to which he was nominated. Then, for “rebellion” he is sentenced to death and... forgiven. Literally mixed with dirt, Mironov “suddenly” turns out to be good. Trotsky proved himself to be an intelligent and unprincipled politician: Mironov is his name. In a telegram to I. Smilga on October 10, 1919, we read: “I am putting for discussion in the Politburo of the Central Committee on the issue of changing the policy towards the Don Cossacks. We give the Don and Kuban complete “autonomy”, our troops clear the Don. The Cossacks are completely breaking with Deninkin.” The calculation was made on Mironov’s authority - “Mironov and his comrades could act as mediators” 76. Mironov’s name was used for agitation and appeals. This is followed by high appointments, awards, even honorary revolutionary weapons. And in the end, in February 1921, he was charged with conspiracy, and on April 2, he was executed.

As the outcome of the war became more and more obvious, authoritative partisan commanders and peasant leaders capable of leading themselves became unnecessary, and even dangerous. Thus, K. Vakulin’s mere statement that F. Mironov was on his side provided him with massive support. A. Sapozhkov clearly belonged to the type of non-party peasant leaders capable of captivating with him - what is his demand for his Red Army soldiers to either shoot him or give him and the entire command staff full confidence 77. The conviction that it is his personality that is the cementing principle for the division , ultimately brought him into conflict with party structures.

The words of A. Sapozhkov are indicative, he believed that “from the center there is an unacceptable attitude towards old, honored revolutionaries”: “A hero like Dumenko was shot. If Chapaev had not been killed, he would, of course, have been shot, just as Budyonny will undoubtedly be shot when they are able to do without him” 78.

In principle, we can talk about a targeted program carried out by the communist leadership at the final stage of the Civil War to discredit and remove (exterminate) the people’s commanders from the Cossack and peasant environment who emerged during the war, who enjoyed well-deserved authority, leaders who were capable of leading (maybe even appropriately) say, charismatic personalities).

The main result of the Civil War for the Cossacks was the completion of the process of “decossackization.” It should be recognized that in the early 20s. The Cossack population has already merged with the rest of the agricultural population - merged in terms of its status, range of interests and tasks. Just as the decree of Peter I on the tax-paying population, at one time, eliminated in principle the differences between groups of the agricultural population by unifying their status and responsibilities, in the same way, the policy pursued by the communist authorities towards farmers brought together previously so different groups, equalizing everyone , as citizens of the “Soviet Republic”.

At the same time, the Cossacks suffered irreparable losses - the officers were knocked out almost entirely, and a significant part of the Cossack intelligentsia died. Many villages were destroyed. A significant number of Cossacks ended up in exile. Political suspicion towards the Cossacks remained for a long time. Involvement, at least indirectly, in the white Cossacks or the insurgent movement left a stigma for the rest of his life. In a number of areas, a large number of Cossacks were deprived of voting rights. Anything reminiscent of the Cossacks was banned. Until the beginning of the 30s. there was a methodical search for those “culpable” before the Soviet regime; accusing someone of involvement in the “Cossack counter-revolution” remained the most serious and inevitably entailed repression.

Notes

Danilov V.P., Tarkhova N. Introduction // Philip Mironov (Quiet Don in 1917 - 1921) Documents and materials. M., 1997. P. 6.

Right there. P. 263.

Right there. P. 138.

News of the CPSU Central Committee. 1989. App. to No. 12. P. 3.

Nikolsky S.A. Power and land. M., 1990. P. 55.

Safonov D.A. Great Peasant War 1920 - 1921 and Southern Urals. Orenburg, 1999. P. 85, 92.

Archive of the FSB Directorate for the Orenburg Region. D. 13893. T. 11. L. 501.

Safonov D.A. Decree. op. P. 275.

Documentation Center for the Contemporary History of the Chelyabinsk Region. F. 77. Op. 1. D. 344. L. 118, vol.

Philip Mironov... P. 375.

Right there. P. 453.

Right there. P. 447.

Archive of the FSB Directorate for the Orenburg Region. D. 13893. T. 11. L. 40.

Right there. L. 502.

D.A.SAFONOV ("WORLD OF HISTORY", 2001, No. 6)

In December 1918, at a meeting of party activists in Kursk, L.D. Trotsky, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and People's Commissar for Naval Affairs, analyzing the results of the year of the civil war, instructed: “It should be clear to each of you that the old ruling classes received their art, their skill in governing as a legacy from their grandfathers and great-grandfathers. What can we do to counter this? How can we compensate for our inexperience? Remember, comrades, only by terror. Consistent and merciless terror! History will never forgive us for our compliance and softness. If so far we have destroyed hundreds and thousands, now the time has come to create an organization whose apparatus, if necessary, can destroy tens of thousands. We don’t have time, we don’t have the opportunity to look for our real, active enemies. We are forced to take the path of destruction."

In confirmation and development of these words, on January 29, 1919, Ya. M. Sverdlov, on behalf of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), sent a circular letter, known as the “directive on de-Cossackization to all responsible comrades working in the Cossack regions.” The directive read:

“The latest events on various fronts and Cossack regions, our advances deeper into Cossack settlements and disintegration among the Cossack troops forces us to give instructions to party workers about the nature of their work in these areas. It is necessary, taking into account the experience of the Civil War with the Cossacks, to recognize the only correct thing to be the most merciless fight against all the top of the Cossacks, through their total extermination.

1. Carry out mass terror against the rich Cossacks, exterminating them without exception; carry out merciless terror against all Cossacks who took any direct or indirect part in the fight against Soviet power. It is necessary to take all those measures towards the average Cossacks that provide a guarantee against any attempts on their part to make new protests against Soviet power.

2. Confiscate bread and force all surplus to be poured into specified points, this applies to both bread and all agricultural products.

3. Take all measures to assist the migrating newcomer poor, organizing resettlement where possible.

4. Equalize nonresident newcomers with the Cossacks in land and all other respects.

5. carry out complete disarmament, shoot everyone who is found to have a weapon after the surrender date.

6. Issue weapons only to reliable elements from out of town.

7. Armed detachments should be left in the Cossack villages until complete order is established.

8. All commissioners appointed to certain Cossack settlements are invited to show maximum firmness and steadily implement these instructions.

The Central Committee decides to carry through the relevant Soviet institutions the commitment of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture to urgently develop actual measures for the mass resettlement of the poor to Cossack lands. Central Committee of the RCP (b)".

There is an opinion that the authorship of the directive on storytelling belongs to only one person - Ya. M. Sverdlov, and neither the Central Committee of the RCP (b) nor the Council of People's Commissars took any part in the adoption of this document. However, analyzing the entire course of the Bolshevik party’s seizure of power in the period 1917-1918, it becomes obvious that there is a pattern of raising violence and lawlessness to the rank of state policy. The desire for limitless dictatorship provoked a cynical justification for the inevitability of terror.

Under these conditions, the terror unleashed against the Cossacks in the occupied villages acquired such proportions that, on March 16, 1919, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was forced to recognize the January directive as erroneous. But the flywheel of the extermination machine was launched, and it was no longer possible to stop it.

The beginning of state genocide on the part of the Bolsheviks and distrust of yesterday’s neighbors - the mountaineers, fear of them, pushed part of the Cossacks again onto the path of struggle against Soviet power, but now as part of General Denikin’s Volunteer Army.

The overt genocide of the Cossacks that began led the Don to disaster, but in the North Caucasus it ended in complete defeat for the Bolsheviks. The 150,000-strong XI Army, which Fedko led after Sorokin’s death, was cumbersomely deploying for the decisive blow. It was covered from the flank by the XII Army occupying the area from Vladikavkaz to Grozny. From these two armies the Caspian-Caucasian Front was created. Things were uneasy in the rear of the Reds. Stavropol peasants were increasingly inclined to whites after the invasion of food detachments. The mountaineers turned away from the Bolsheviks, even those who supported them during the period of general anarchy. Thus, the Chechens, Kabardians and Ossetians had their own civil war: some wanted to go with the Reds, others with the Whites, and still others wanted to build an Islamic state. The Kalmyks openly hated the Bolsheviks after the outrages committed against them. After the bloody suppression of the Bicherakhov uprising, the Terek Cossacks hid.

On January 4, 1919, the Volunteer Army dealt a crushing blow to the XI Red Army in the area of ​​the village of Nevinnomyssk and, having broken through the front, began to pursue the enemy in two directions - to the Holy Cross and to Mineralnye Vody. The gigantic XI Army began to fall apart. Ordzhonikidze insisted on withdrawing to Vladikavkaz. Most commanders were against it, believing that an army pressed against the mountains would fall into a trap. Already on January 19, Pyatigorsk was captured by the Whites, and on January 20, the Georgievsk group of the Reds was defeated.

To repel the white troops and to direct all military operations in the region, by decision of the Caucasian Regional Committee of the RCP (b), at the end of December 1918, the Defense Council of the North Caucasus was created, headed by G. K. Ordzhonikidze. At the direction of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, weapons and ammunition were sent to the North Caucasus to help the XI Army.

But, despite all the measures taken, parts of the Red Army were unable to withstand the onslaught of the Volunteer Army. The Extraordinary Commissar of the South of Russia G.K. Ordzhonikidze, in a telegram addressed to V.I. Lenin dated January 24, 1919, reported on the state of affairs: “There is no XI Army. She completely decomposed. The enemy occupies cities and villages almost without resistance. At night, the question was to leave the entire Terek region and go to Astrakhan.”

On January 25, 1919, during the general offensive of the Volunteer Army in the North Caucasus, the Kabardian Cavalry Brigade, consisting of two regiments under the command of Captain Zaurbek Dautokov-Serebryakov, occupied Nalchik and Baksan in battle. And on January 26, A.G. Shkuro’s detachments occupied the Kotlyarevskaya and Prokhladnaya railway stations. At the same time, the White Guard Circassian division and two Cossack Plastun battalions, turning to the right from the village of Novoossetinskaya, reached the Terek near the Kabardian village of Abaevo and, connecting at the Kotlyarevskaya station with Shkuro’s detachments, moved along the railway line to Vladikavkaz. By the beginning of February, the white units of generals Shkuro, Pokrovsky and Ulagai blocked the administrative center of the Terek region, the city of Vladikavkaz, on three sides. On February 10, 1919, Vladikavkaz was captured. Denikin's command forced the XI Red Army to retreat across the hungry steppes to Astrakhan. The remnants of the XII Red Army crumbled. Extraordinary Commissioner of the South of Russia G.K. Ordzhonikidze with a small detachment fled to Ingushetia, some units under the command of N. Gikalo went to Dagestan, and the bulk, already representing chaotic crowds of refugees, poured into Georgia through winter passes, freezing in the mountains, dying from avalanches and snowfalls, exterminated by yesterday's allies - the mountaineers. The Georgian government, fearing typhus, refused to let them in. The Reds tried to storm their way out of the Daryal Gorge but were met with machine gun fire. Many died. The remnants surrendered to the Georgians and were interned as prisoners of war.

By the time the Volunteer Army occupied the North Caucasus, of the independent Terek units that survived the defeat of the uprising, only a detachment of Terek Cossacks in Petrovsk, led by the commander of the Terek Territory troops, Major General I.N. Kosnikov, remained. It included the Grebensky and Gorsko-Mozdoksky cavalry regiments, a horse hundred of Kopay Cossacks, the 1st Mozdok and 2nd Grebensky Plastun battalions, a hundred foot Kopay Cossacks, the 1st and 2nd artillery divisions. By February 14, 1919, the detachment numbered 2,088 people.

One of the first units of the Terets to join the Volunteer Army was the Terek officer regiment, formed on November 1, 1918 from the officer detachment of Colonel B. N. Litvinov, who arrived in the army after the defeat of the Terek uprising (disbanded in March 1919), as well as detachments of colonels V. K. Agoeva, Z. Dautokova-Serebryakova and G. A. Kibirov.

On November 8, 1918, the 1st Terek Cossack Regiment was formed as part of the Volunteer Army (later merged into the 1st Terek Cossack Division). The widespread formation of Terek units began with the establishment of the Volunteer Army in the North Caucasus. The basis of the Terek formations in the Civil War were the 1, 2, 3 and 4th Terek Cossack divisions and the 1, 2, 3 and 4th Terek Plastun brigades, as well as the Terek Cossack horse-artillery divisions and separate batteries, which were part of both the Troops Terek-Dagestan Territory, as well as the Volunteer and Caucasian Volunteer Armies. Beginning in February 1919, Terek formations were already conducting independent military operations against the Red Army. This was especially significant for the white forces in the south, in connection with the transfer of the Caucasian Volunteer Army to the Northern Front.

The Terek Plastun separate brigade was formed as part of the Volunteer Army on December 9, 1918 from the newly formed 1st and 2nd Terek Plastun battalions and the Terek Cossack artillery division, which included the 1st Terek Cossack and 2nd Terek Plastun batteries.

With the end of the North Caucasus Operation of the Volunteer Army, the Armed Forces in the South of Russia established control over most of the territory of the North Caucasus. On January 10, 1919, A.I. Denikin appointed the commander of the III Army Corps, General V.P. Lyakhov, as commander-in-chief and commander of the troops of the created Terek-Dagestan Territory. The newly appointed commander, in order to recreate the Terek Cossack army, was ordered to assemble a Cossack Circle to select a Chieftain. The Terek Great Military Circle began its work on February 22, 1919. More than twenty issues were put on the agenda, but in the first row in terms of importance was the issue of adopting a new Constitution for the region, which was then adopted on February 27. The day after the adoption of the Constitution, elections for a military chieftain took place. He became Major General G. A. Vdovenko, a Cossack from the State village. The Big Circle showed support for the Volunteer Army and elected the Small Circle (Commission of Legislative Provisions). At the same time, the Military Circle decided to temporarily locate military authorities and the residence of the military chieftain in the city of Pyatigorsk.

The territories liberated from Soviet power returned to the mainstream of peaceful life. The former Terek region itself was transformed into the Terek-Dagestan region with its center in Pyatigorsk. The Cossacks evicted from the Sunzha villages in 1918 were returned back.

The British tried to limit the advance of the White Guards by retaining the oil fields of Grozny and Dagestan for small “sovereign” entities, such as the government of the Central Caspian Sea and the Gorsko-Dagestan government. The British detachments, even having landed in Petrovsk, began moving towards Grozny. Ahead of the British, the White Guard units entered Grozny on February 8 and moved further, occupying the Caspian coast to Derbent.

In the mountains, which the White Guard troops approached, confusion reigned. Each nation had its own government, or even several. Thus, the Chechens formed two national governments, which fought bloody wars among themselves for several weeks. The dead were counted in the hundreds. Almost every valley had its own money, often homemade, and the generally accepted “convertible” currency was rifle cartridges. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and even Great Britain tried to act as guarantors of “mountain autonomies”. But the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army A.I. Denikin (whom Soviet propaganda loved to portray as a puppet of the Entente) decisively demanded the abolition of all these “autonomies.” By installing governors in the national regions from white officers of these nationalities. So, for example, on January 19, 1919, the commander-in-chief of the Terek-Dagestan region, Lieutenant General V.P. Lyakhov, issued an order according to which a colonel, later major general, Tembot Zhankhotovich Bekovich-Cherkassky was appointed ruler of Kabarda. His assistants were Captain Zaurbek Dautokov-Serebryakov for the military department, and Colonel Sultanbek Kasaevich Klishbiev for civil administration.

Relying on the support of the local nobility, General Denikin convened mountain congresses in Kabarda, Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan in March 1919. These congresses elected Rulers and Councils under them, who had extensive judicial and administrative powers. Sharia law was preserved in criminal and family matters.

At the beginning of 1919, in the Terek-Dagestan region, a system of self-government of the region of two centers was formed: Cossack and volunteer (both were located in Pyatigorsk). As A.I. Denikin later noted, the unresolved nature of a number of issues dating back to pre-revolutionary times, lack of agreement in relationships, and the influence of the Kuban independents on the Tertsy could not but give rise to friction between these two authorities. Only thanks to the awareness of the mortal danger in the event of a rupture, the absence of independent tendencies among the masses of the Terek Cossacks, and personal relationships between representatives of both branches of government, the state mechanism in the North Caucasus worked throughout 1919 without significant interruptions. Until the end of white power, the region continued to be in double subordination: the representative of the volunteer government (General Lyakhov was replaced by cavalry general I. G. Erdeli on April 16 (29), 1919) was guided by the “Basic Provisions” on the Terek-Dagestan region, the drafting of which was completed by the Special meeting in May 1919; the military ataman ruled on the basis of the Terek Constitution.

Political disagreements and misunderstandings between representatives of the two authorities, as a rule, ended in the adoption of a compromise decision. Friction between the two centers of power throughout 1919 was created mainly by a small but influential part of the radical independent Terek intelligentsia in the government and the Circle. The most obvious illustration is the position of the Terek faction of the Supreme Cossack Circle, which gathered in Yekaterinodar on January 5 (18), 1920 as the supreme authority of the Don, Kuban and Terek. The Terek faction maintained a loyal attitude towards the government of the South of Russia, based on the position that separatism was unacceptable for the army and the fate of the mountain issue. The resolution to sever relations with Denikin was adopted by the Supreme Circle of the Don, Kuban and Terek with a small number of votes from the Terek faction, most of which went home.

In the territory liberated from the Bolsheviks, transport was improved, paralyzed enterprises were opened, and trade revived. In May 1919, the South-Eastern Russian Church Council was held in Stavropol. The Council was attended by bishops, clergy and laity selected from the Stavropol, Don, Kuban, Vladikavkaz and Sukhumi-Black Sea dioceses, as well as members of the All-Russian Local Council who found themselves in the south of the country. At the Council, issues of the spiritual and social structure of this vast territory were discussed, and the Supreme Provisional Church Administration was formed. Its chairman was Archbishop of Don Mitrofan (Simashkevich), members were Archbishop of Tauride Dimitri (Abashidze), Bishop of Taganrog Arseny (Smolenets), Protopresbyter G. I. Schavelsky, Professor A. P. Rozhdestvensky, Count V. Musin-Pushkin and Professor P. Verkhovsky.

Thus, with the arrival of white troops in the Terek region, the Cossack military government was restored, headed by ataman Major General G. A. Vdovenko. The “South-Eastern Union of Cossack Troops, Highlanders of the Caucasus and Free Peoples of the Steppes” continued its work, the basis of which was the idea of ​​a federal beginning of the Don, Kuban, Terek, the North Caucasus region, as well as the Astrakhan, Ural and Orenburg troops. The political goal of the Union was to join it as an independent state association to the future Russian Federation.

A.I. Denikin, in turn, advocated for “preserving the unity of the Russian state, subject to the granting of autonomy to individual nationalities and original formations (Cossacks), as well as broad decentralization of all government administration... The basis for the decentralization of government was the division of the occupied territory into regions.”

Recognizing the fundamental right of autonomy for the Cossack troops, Denikin made a reservation in relation to the Terek army, which “due to the extreme stripes and the need to reconcile the interests of the Cossacks and highlanders” was supposed to enter the North Caucasus region on the basis of autonomy. It was planned to include representatives of the Cossacks and mountain peoples in the new structures of regional power. Mountain peoples were given broad self-government within ethnic boundaries, with an elected administration, non-interference from the state in matters of religion and public education, but without funding for these programs from the state budget.

Unlike the Don and Kuban, on the Terek the “connection with all-Russian statehood” has not weakened. On June 21, 1919, Gerasim Andreevich Vdovenko, elected military ataman, opened the next Great Circle of the Terek Cossack Army in the Park Theater in the city of Essentuki. The Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army A.I. Denikin was also present at the circle. The program of the Terek government stated that “only a decisive victory over Bolshevism and the revival of Russia will create the possibility of restoring the power and native troops, bloodless and weakened by the civil struggle.”

In view of the ongoing war, the Terets were interested in increasing their numbers by involving their neighboring allies in the anti-Bolshevik struggle. Thus, the Karanogai people were included in the Terek Army, and at the Great Circle the Cossacks expressed their agreement in principle to the Ossetians and Kabardians joining the Army “on equal rights.” The situation was more complicated with the nonresident population. Encouraging the entry of individual representatives of indigenous peasants into the Cossack class, the Terets were very prejudiced towards the demand of non-residents to resolve the land issue, to introduce them into the work of the Circle, as well as into central and local government bodies.

In the Terek region liberated from the Bolsheviks, complete mobilization took place. In addition to the Cossack regiments, units formed from highlanders were also sent to the front. Wanting to confirm loyalty to Denikin, even yesterday’s enemies of the Terets - the Chechens and Ingush - responded to the call of the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army and replenished the White Guard ranks with their volunteers.

Already in May 1919, in addition to the Kuban combat units, the Circassian Cavalry Division and the Karachay Cavalry Brigade operated on the Tsaritsyn Front. The 2nd Terek Cossack Division, 1st Terek Plastun Brigade, Kabardian Cavalry Division, Ingush Cavalry Brigade, Dagestan Cavalry Brigade and Ossetian Cavalry Regiment, who arrived from the Terek and Dagestan, were also transferred here. In Ukraine, the 1st Terek Cossack Division and the Chechen Cavalry Division were deployed against Makhno.

The situation in the North Caucasus remained extremely difficult. In June, Ingushetia launched an uprising, but a week later it was suppressed. Kabarda and Ossetia were disturbed by the Balkars and “Kermenists” (representatives of the Ossetian revolutionary democratic organization) with their forays. In the mountainous part of Dagestan, Ali-Khadzhi raised an uprising, and in August this “baton” was taken up by the Chechen sheikh Uzun-Khadzhi, who settled in Vedeno. All nationalist and religious protests in the North Caucasus were not only supported, but also provoked by anti-Russian circles in Turkey and Georgia. The constant military danger forced Denikin to keep up to 15 thousand soldiers in this region under the command of General I. G. Erdeli, including two Terek divisions - the 3rd and 4th, and another Plastun brigade that belonged to the North Caucasus group.

Meanwhile, the situation at the front was even more deplorable. Thus, by December 1919, General Denikin’s Volunteer Army, under pressure from three times superior enemy forces, had lost 50% of its personnel. As of December 1, there were 42,733 wounded people alone in military medical institutions in the south of Russia. A large-scale retreat of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia began. On November 19, units of the Red Army broke into Kursk, on December 10, Kharkov was abandoned, on December 28, Tsaritsyn, and already on January 9, 1920, Soviet troops entered Rostov-on-Don.

On January 8, 1920, the Terek Cossacks suffered irreparable losses - units of Budyonny’s First Cavalry Army almost completely destroyed the Terek Plastun brigade. At the same time, the commander of the cavalry corps, General K.K. Mamontov, despite the order to attack the enemy, withdrew his corps through Aksai to the left bank of the Don.

In January 1920, the Armed Forces of the South of Russia numbered 81,506 people, of which: Volunteer units - 30,802, Don Army - 37,762, Kuban Army - 8,317, Terek Army - 3,115, Astrakhan Army - 468, Mountain units - 1042. These forces were clearly not enough to restrain the advance of the Reds, but the separatist games of the Cossack leaders continued at this critical moment for all anti-Bolshevik forces.

On January 18, 1920, the Cossack Supreme Circle met in Yekaterinodar, which began to create an independent union state and declared itself the supreme authority over the affairs of the Don, Kuban and Terek. Some of the Don delegates and almost all of the Terets called for the continuation of the struggle in unity with the main command. Most of the Kuban, part of the Don and several Terets demanded a complete break with Denikin. Some of the Kuban and Donets were inclined to stop fighting.

According to A.I. Denikin, “only the Tertsy - the ataman, the government and the Circle faction - almost in full force represented a united front.” The Kuban people were reproached for abandoning the front by the Kuban units, and proposals were made to separate the eastern departments (“lineists”) from this army and annex them to the Terek. Terek ataman G. A. Vdovenko spoke with the following words: “The Terets have one current. We have “United and indivisible Russia” written in golden letters.

At the end of January 1920, a compromise provision was developed and accepted by all parties:

1. South Russian power is established on the basis of an agreement between the main command of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia and the Supreme Circle of the Don, Kuban and Terek, until the convening of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

2. Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin is recognized as the first head of the South Russian government...

3. The law on the succession of power of the head of state is developed by the Legislative Chamber on a general basis.

4. Legislative power in the South of Russia is exercised by the Legislative Chamber.

5. The functions of the executive branch, in addition to the head of the South Russian government, are determined by the Council of Ministers...

6. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers is appointed by the person heading the South Russian government.

7. The person heading the South Russian government has the right to dissolve the Legislative Chamber and the right of relative “veto”...

In agreement with the three factions of the Supreme Circle, a cabinet of ministers was formed, but “the emergence of a new government did not bring any change in the course of events.”

The military and political crisis of the White South was growing. Government reform no longer saved the situation - the front collapsed. On February 29, 1920, units of the Red Army captured Stavropol, on March 17, Yekaterinodar and the village of Nevinnomysskaya fell, on March 22 - Vladikavkaz, on March 23 - Kizlyar, on March 24 - Grozny, on March 27 - Novorossiysk, on March 30 - Port Petrovsk and on April 7 - Tuapse. . Soviet power was restored almost throughout the entire territory of the North Caucasus, which was confirmed by the decree of March 25, 1920.

Part of the army of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia (about 30 thousand people) was evacuated from Novorossiysk to Crimea. The Terek Cossacks who left Vladikavkaz (altogether about 12 thousand people along with refugees) went along the Georgian Military Road to Georgia, where they were interned in camps near Poti, in a swampy, malarial area. The demoralized Cossack units, squeezed on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, mostly surrendered to the red units.

On April 4, 1920, A.I. Denikin gave the order to appoint Lieutenant General Baron P.N. Wrangel as his successor to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia.

After the evacuation of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia to Crimea, from the remnants of the Terek and Astrakhan Cossack units in April 1920, the Separate Terek-Astrakhan Cossack Brigade was formed, which from April 28, as the Terek-Astrakhan Brigade, was part of the 3rd Cavalry Division of the Consolidated Corps. On July 7, after reorganization, the brigade again became separate. In the summer of 1920, she was part of the Special Forces Group that participated in the Kuban landing. From September 4, the brigade operated separately as part of the Russian Army and included the 1st Terek, 1st and 2nd Astrakhan regiments and the Terek-Astrakhan Cossack horse artillery division and the Separate Terek reserve Cossack hundred.

The attitude of the Cossacks towards Baron Wrangel was ambivalent. On the one hand, he contributed to the dispersal of the Kuban Regional Rada in 1919, on the other hand, his toughness and commitment to order impressed the Cossacks. The Cossacks’ attitude towards him was not spoiled by the fact that Wrangel put the Don general Sidorin on trial for the fact that he telegraphed the military ataman Bogaevsky about his decision “to withdraw the Don army from the Crimea and the subordination in which it is now located.”

The situation with the Kuban Cossacks was more complicated. Military ataman Bukretov was opposed to the evacuation of Cossack units squeezed on the Black Sea coast to Crimea. Wrangel was not immediately able to send the ataman to the Caucasus to organize the evacuation, and the remnants of those who did not surrender to the Reds (about 17 thousand people) were only able to board ships on May 4. Bukretov transferred the ataman power to the chairman of the Kuban government, Ivanis, and together with the “independent” deputies of the Rada, taking with them part of the military treasury, he fled to Georgia. The Kuban Rada, which gathered in Feodosia, recognized Bukretov and Ivanis as traitors, and elected military general Ulagai as military chieftain, but he refused power.

The small Terek group led by Ataman Vdovenko was traditionally hostile to separatist movements and, therefore, had nothing in common with the ambitious Cossack leaders.

The lack of unity in the political Cossack camp and Wrangel’s uncompromising attitude towards “independence” allowed the commander-in-chief of the Russian army to conclude an agreement with the military atamans that he considered necessary for the state structure of Russia. Gathering together Bogaevsky, Ivanis, Vdovenko and Lyakhov, Wrangel gave them 24 hours to think, and thus, “On July 22, a solemn signing of an agreement took place ... with the atamans and governments of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan ... in development of the agreement of 2 (15 ) April this year...

1. The state formations of Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan are ensured complete independence in their internal structure and management.

2. The chairmen of the governments of state entities of Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan or their replacement members of their governments participate in the Council of Heads of Departments under the Government and the Commander-in-Chief, with the right to a decisive vote on all issues.

3. The Commander-in-Chief is assigned full power over all armed forces of state entities... both in operational terms and on fundamental issues of army organization.

4. All necessary for supply... food and other means are provided... according to a special allocation.

5. Management of railways and main telegraph lines is vested in the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

6. Agreement and negotiations with foreign governments, both in the field of political and commercial policy, are carried out by the Ruler and Commander-in-Chief. If these negotiations concern the interests of one of the state entities..., the Ruler and Commander-in-Chief first enters into an agreement with the subject ataman.

7. A common customs line and a single indirect taxation are established...

8. A unified monetary system is established on the territory of the contracting parties...

9. Upon the liberation of the territory of state entities... this agreement must be submitted for approval by large military Circles and regional Councils, but will take effect immediately upon its signing.

10. This agreement is established until the complete end of the Civil War.”

The unsuccessful landing of the Kuban landing party led by General Ulaym in the Kuban in August 1920, and the stalled September offensive on the Kakhovka bridgehead forced Baron Wrangel to withdraw within the Crimean Peninsula and begin preparations for defense and evacuation.

By the beginning of the offensive on November 7, 1920, the Red Army numbered 133 thousand bayonets and sabers; the Russian Army had 37 thousand bayonets and sabers. The superior forces of the Soviet troops broke the defense, and already on November 12, Baron Wrangel issued an order to abandon Crimea. Organized by the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, the evacuation was completed on November 16, 1920 and made it possible to save about 150 thousand military and civilians, of which about 30 thousand Cossacks.

The territory of Russia was abandoned by the remnants of the last provisional national government and the last legitimate governments of the Cossack troops of the Russian Empire, including Terek.

After the evacuation of the Russian army from Crimea to Chataldzha, the Terek-Astrakhan regiment was formed as part of the Don Corps. After the transformation of the army into the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS), the regiment until the 1930s was a cadre unit. So by the fall of 1925, the regiment numbered 427 people, including 211 officers.