The Bosphorus Strait on the world map is a strait between the black and marble seas - a strait between Europe and Asia. Straits, Bosphorus and Dardanelles

The right of passage of warships and merchant ships through the Black Sea straits of the Bosphorus, the Sea of ​​Marmara and the Dardanelles defined by the Convention of July 20, 1936.
It was signed by all Black Sea states, including the USSR, as well as many European countries in Montreux (Switzerland) and regulates the legal regime for passage through the Black Sea straits..
In everyday life it is called - Montreux Convention.
I will particularly dwell on the provisions of this Convention, since the Black Sea straits are the most important and only exit for ships and vessels of our state from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and further through Gibraltar to the Atlantic, and through the Suez Canal to the Indian and Pacific oceans.

The issue of navigation through the Black Sea straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles is one of the long-standing international problems. The Black Sea powers have always sought to obtain free access to the Mediterranean Sea for their ships and vessels, without prejudice to the interests of Turkey, without which any agreement on the Black Sea straits would have been impossible. Non-Black Sea countries, for their part, sought permission for their ships to enter the Black Sea.
In peacetime, merchant ships enjoy complete freedom of passage and navigation in the Black Sea straits day and night, regardless of the flag of the state and the cargo being transported and without any formalities. Pilotage in the straits is optional. The Montreux Convention grants Turkey the right to collect a fee from each passing vessel to cover the costs of sanitary control, navigation fences and maintenance of the rescue service.

The procedure for the passage of warships through the Black Sea straits is regulated by Articles 8-22 of the Convention. From Annex IV to the Convention on the Regime of the Straits it is clear that the fleets of the Black Sea states can include ships of any class (i.e., aircraft carriers). During the passage of the straits, aircraft flights on board ships are prohibited.

Non-Black Sea countries are allowed to carry through the straits into the Black Sea only light surface ships and auxiliary vessels with a displacement of no more than 10,000 tons per ship.
The total displacement of a detachment of ships at the time of passage of the straits should not exceed 15,000 tons. and their passage is allowed only during the daytime.
Non-Black Sea states do not have the right to introduce aircraft carriers and submarines into the Black Sea. The total tonnage of a squadron of warships of non-Black Sea countries located in the Black Sea should not exceed 45,000 tons.

The stay of a detachment of warships from non-Black Sea countries on the Black Sea should not exceed 21 days, regardless of the purpose of the visit.

The Turkish authorities must be notified through diplomatic channels about the passage of warships through the Black Sea straits, for non-Black Sea countries - 15 days in advance, for Black Sea countries - usually 8 days in advance, but not less than three.

The passage of foreign warships through the straits during war is regulated. If Türkiye is a belligerent, then the passage of ships depends solely on the Turkish government.

The Black Sea states are obliged annually, as of January 1 and July 1, to report to the Turkish government the total displacement of the ships of their fleet.

The Montreux Convention was concluded in 1936 for 20 years and is automatically extended for another 20 years if there are no comments from the signatory states two years before the expiration date.
The Montreux Convention continues to operate today.

According to a document distributed by the Novorossiysk information service, in 1980, about 20,000 ships passed through the straits, more than a third of them under the flag of the USSR (according to Lloyd's, in 1967, 11,926 ships passed through the straits, of which 2,736 were Soviet. Over 12 years almost doubled in size!). According to Turkish data, in 1977, of the 272 warships passing through the Black Sea straits, 91% were Soviet.

Russia considered the annexation of Istanbul and the Straits to be a well-deserved prize following the victory in World War I. However, the British and French did everything possible to prevent this from happening. The Russian General Staff was also unable to carry out the operation to capture the Straits.

For some reason, the idea was firmly ingrained in the Russian patriotic consciousness that, as a result of winning the First World War, Russia should have received the Bosporus and Dardanelles, as well as “Constantinople” (Constantinople, Istanbul). Russia's Entente allies, France and England, never made such a legal promise; everything was limited to oral agreements or some memorandums (compare the degree of legal elaboration of treaties on the post-war system at the Yalta Conference in 1945).

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits are 190 km apart and are separated by the Sea of ​​Marmara (an area of ​​11.5 thousand km). The straits connect the open sea (Mediterranean) with the closed sea (Black). A sea vessel traveling from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea enters the Bosphorus, on the banks of which the former capital of Turkey, Istanbul, is located. A rather narrow (in some places its width reaches 750 m) strait, about 30 km long, off its Asian shores formed the Golden Horn Bay, 12 km long and up to 33 m deep.

Passing the Bosphorus, the ship enters the Sea of ​​Marmara, and after some time it is met by another strait - the Dardanelles. It has a length of 60 km, a width of 1.3 km at its narrowest part, and 7.5 km at its widest part and separates the Gallipoli Peninsula, which belongs to the European continent, and the northwestern coast of Asia Minor.

The Bosporus and Dardanelles straits have always been strategically significant for Russia. For the south of the huge empire, they were the only exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, which at the end of the 19th century was the center of world civilization and trade. The struggle for the straits is one of the oldest problems in international relations, which remains relevant to this day.

The Russian intelligentsia also understood the impossibility of obtaining the Straits. Above is one of the maps (by clicking on it and other maps you can see them in an enlarged size), issued in 1915 in Russia. It depicts the redrawing of the borders of Europe following the results of the First World War won by the Entente. It is clearly visible that the Straits on the map are Turkish. But Russia would have to acquire East Prussia, the territory of present-day Slovakia, and eastern Galicia. Poland would also become part of eastern Germany.

Chronologically, one can trace the main discussions at the level of diplomacy and the actions of the General Staff regarding the Straits and the future of Turkey.
On September 26, 1914, Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov sent an official note to the governments of France and England, which outlined the Russian government’s point of view on the issue of the goals of the Entente during the war that began in the Balkans. It stated that “the Turks must remain in Constantinople and its environs,” but Russia must receive guarantees of free passage through the straits. There were no direct claims to the straits and adjacent Turkish territory at that time. They arose at the state level after Turkey came out on the side of Germany.

On February 25, 1915, British and English warships bombarded the Ottoman forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles Strait and began the Dardanelles Operation. France and England did not inform Russia about the preparation of this operation; Petrograd learned about it through intelligence channels from Paris.

France and England involved Greece in the operation. which caused an extremely negative reaction in Petrograd - there were fears that Athens would demand Constantinople as a reward. If the planned operation was successful, the Straits would in any case come under the control of England and France, which forced Russia to demand from its allies official assurances that the Straits would be transferred to it after the war and Constantinople. Even direct threats from the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov were used. With the permission of the Tsar, he directly hinted to the members of the Entente that Russia could conclude a separate peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

(This map and below are various plans for the reconstruction of Europe on the part of Germany)

The threats had an effect, and on March 12, 1915, London, with an official note, guaranteed the transfer to Russia of the city of Constantinople with the surrounding territories, which included the western coast of the Bosphorus and the Sea of ​​Marmara, the Gallipoli Peninsula, Southern Thrace along the Enos - Media line, and in addition the eastern coast of the Bosphorus and the Sea of ​​Marmara to the Gulf of Ismit, all the islands of the Sea of ​​Marmara, as well as the islands of Imbros and Tenedos in the Aegean.

The British did not consider their promise to Russia about the transfer of the Straits to be serious. Lord Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris, wrote about these agreements in his diary:

“December 17th. I also talked with Gray about the situation in France, about American mediation, about the future of Belgium, about Italy, etc. I pointed out Russian claims regarding Constantinople and the straits. Gray said that we must fulfill the promises we have made, namely, that Russia must receive the right of free passage for its warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and back in peacetime, while in wartime participants in the war will enjoy equal rights. I noticed that if the Turks left Constantinople, a situation would be created that would be completely different from the one under which all these promises were made; that the rights and privileges accorded to Russia cannot be denied to Romania, which has its border on the Black Sea, or to Bulgaria. The correct solution would be the following: Constantinople is transformed into a free city, all forts on the Dardanelles and Bosphorus are destroyed, and the Suez Canal regime is applied to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus under a European guarantee. Gray doubts Russia's agreement to such terms. In general, the question of the disposal of Constantinople and the straits will be a stumbling block when the time comes to discuss such subjects.

February 22...I hope that public opinion in England and abroad will force the powers to reject in principle the Russian point of view about the rights of Muscovites in relation to Constantinople and the straits between the Black and Mediterranean seas. I am afraid that Gray does not take as strong a position on this issue as I would like; I mean internationalization along the lines of the Suez Canal regime; this would not satisfy Izvolsky (Russian Ambassador to France - BT) and his master. Our newest and largest ship, the Queen Elizabeth in the Dardanelles; We have very large forces there.

February 26...There is growing suspicion here regarding Russia's intentions regarding Constantinople. They consider it expedient for England and France (in this matter England is placed outside France) to occupy Constantinople before Russia, so that the Muscovite does not have the opportunity to completely independently decide the question of the future of this city and the straits - the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

Russia's withdrawal from the war, or, worse, its reorientation toward Germany, threatened the collapse of the Entente. A split arose in English ruling circles on this issue. Winston Churchill proposed limiting ourselves to general assurances to the Russians of sympathy for the issues raised; Bonar Law asserted that “if Russia has everything she wants, the result will be the alienation of Italy and the Balkan states.” They were objected to by Sir Edward Gray, who pointed out that if England did not support Russia in matters of the straits, then Germany would support it, and then a separate peace between them was inevitable. “It is absurd,” said Gray, “that such a gigantic empire as Russia should be doomed to have ports blocked by ice for a large part of the year, or ports such as those on the Black Sea that are closed in the event of any war.”

As a result, Gray's opinion prevailed in the British cabinet. He was also supported by Lloyd George, who believed that for Constantinople and the straits the Russians would be ready to make huge concessions on other issues. “The Russians are so eager to take control of Constantinople that they will be generous with concessions in all other places.”

Russia had every reason not to trust the British and French. And to guarantee its interests in the Straits, it had to launch a “counter” operation - from the east of Istanbul. The situation could be explained briefly: whichever member of the Entente is the first to capture Istanbul and the Straits will belong to him at the end of the war. Already in 1915, the Russian General Staff began to develop an operation to land troops on the western shore of the Black Sea.

For the success of the operation, the most important circumstance for the Russians would be the possession of the Bulgarian city of Burgas. Nicholas II generally considered it very desirable for Bulgaria to enter the war on the side of the Entente and negotiated with the Bulgarian Tsar on this matter. Admiral Bubnov described his conversation with Nicholas II regarding Burgos in the fall of 1915: “This Bulgarian port was of great importance for the Bosphorus operation, of which the Sovereign was an ardent supporter. The fact is that Burgas was the only port near the Bosphorus where it was possible to land a large landing force, without which our General Staff and, in particular, General. Alekseev, categorically did not consider it possible to undertake an operation to seize the Bosporus. Secret negotiations with Bulgaria had long been held about this port, which, however, were unsuccessful, because Bulgaria demanded Macedonia for joining on our side and introducing Burgos to us, to which Serbia did not want to give its consent for anything.”

The Bosphorus operation was postponed more than once from 1915 to the summer of 1916, from the summer of 1916 to the summer of 1917. It was obvious that Russia did not have the strength to carry it out. The death of the battleship Empress Maria, the most modern ship in the Black Sea Fleet, launched in 1913, put an end to the operation. It was he who was assigned the main role in supporting the landing on the Turkish coast.

The battleship was in the port of Sevastopol, ready to go to sea, when on October 7, 1916, a terrible fire broke out on board, claiming the lives of 152 sailors. Due to fears that the fire would spread to the port's powder warehouses, the command ordered the battleship to be scuttled. This was a big loss for the Russian Navy. People started talking about sabotage and mutiny on the ship. The fire on the Empress Maria began to be fanned by the opposition, which suspected “a German hand at the court of Nicholas II” in its death.

Later, in emigration, part of the white officers expressed the opinion that the death of the battleship Empress Maria was much more profitable for England and France, since without it the Bosphorus operation would have been impossible for Russia.

History does not have a subjunctive mood, and the result of the First World War is well known - Russia was defeated in it, and the finale was the signing of surrender in Brest-Litovsk in 1918. Russia did not mention any more about expansion to the warm seas and to the south in general, knowing full well that its invasion of the zone of historically conditioned interests of the West threatens it with another artificial shock.

Now the passage of ships through the straits, according to international convention, is free and free. However, Türkiye is the regulator of traffic across the Bosphorus, which allows it to take advantage of the situation. For example, in 2004, when the volume of Russian oil exports increased significantly, Turkey introduced restrictions on ship traffic in the Bosphorus. This led to traffic jams in the strait, and oil workers suffered losses due to tanker downtime and delays in deliveries in amounts exceeding $100,000 per day. Then Russia brought charges against Turkey for artificially restricting the movement of ships in the straits, which is a political decision in order to redirect Russian oil exports to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, whose services, of course, are not free.

But this is not Turkey's only idea to benefit from its geophysical position. The country put forward and even successfully developed the idea of ​​​​building a Bosphorus Canal parallel to the Strait, the services of which would be paid. The idea is good, and transportation by water will cost significantly less than by oil pipeline. However, the project, tentatively estimated at $20 billion, has not yet inspired investors, and no money has yet been found for its implementation.

And I will remind you how it was carried out and whether

After Türkiye shot down a Russian bomber in Syria, relations between the two countries became tense. In this situation, the issue of control over the Black Sea straits (which successively connect the Black Sea with the Marmara, and the Marmara with the Aegean, providing access to the Mediterranean) becomes of key importance.

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits are the most important global military-economic artery; they play an important logistical role in the logistical supply of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria.

As stated by the press secretary of the Russian President Dmitry Peskov, “the rules of maritime navigation through the Black Sea straits are regulated by international law - the Montreux Convention - and here we, of course, count on the inviolability of the norms of freedom of navigation through the Black Sea straits.”

Let's find out how the Montreux Convention regulates the rights of Russia, Turkey and other powers in relation to the straits. First, let's briefly talk about the role of the straits in a historical context.

Geopolitical center of Europe

The issue of the Black Sea Straits has at all times been the most important area of ​​Russian foreign policy, in which Russia has traditionally been opposed by Western powers and Turkey. Since the 19th century, attempts have been constantly made to regulate the use of the straits by world powers, with varying success for each side.

The main beneficiary of this situation was Great Britain, which, although not a Black Sea power, nevertheless built its geopolitical interests in the region - largely at the expense of Turkey and the other Black Sea powers. As for Russia, it consistently defended not only its interests, but also the sovereignty of Turkey (in particular, at the Lausanne Conference of 1922, when the very existence of the Turkish state was in question).

In 1936, the status of the straits was finally settled by the Montreux Convention, which restored Turkey's sovereignty over the Black Sea straits and also guaranteed the special rights of the Black Sea states regarding the use of the straits. Thus, the British idea was rejected to equalize the rights of the Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers to the passage of their warships through the straits, gaining under such a pretext a significant military advantage.

Let us consider the main provisions of the Montreux Convention concerning the regulation of the passage through the straits of merchant and military ships of the Black Sea and other powers in peacetime and war.

Article 2 of the Convention recognizes the right of free passage of merchant ships of all countries through the straits in both peace and war. At the same time, Article 6 of the Convention contains the condition that if Turkey considers itself to be under immediate military danger, the right of free passage is also preserved - but with the condition that ships must enter the straits during the day, and passage must be made along the route indicated by the Turkish authorities .

Warships and Turkey's right to close the straits

As for the regime for the passage of warships, it is different in relation to the Black Sea and non-Black Sea states.

The Black Sea powers have the right to conduct any of their warships through the straits in peacetime (subject to prior notification to the Turkish authorities).

For warships of non-Black Sea powers, the Convention establishes class restrictions, allowing small surface ships, small combat and auxiliary vessels to pass through the straits. The total maximum tonnage of all ships of foreign maritime detachments that may be in transit through the straits must not exceed 15,000 tons. The total tonnage of military vessels of non-Black Sea states in the Black Sea cannot exceed 30,000 tons (with the possibility of increasing this maximum to 45,000 tons in the event of an increase in the number of navies of the Black Sea countries) with a stay of no more than 21 days.

Key provisions of the Convention are Turkey's rights to close the straits in wartime.

During a war in which Turkey is not involved, the straits are closed to the passage of military vessels of any belligerent power. If Turkey is involved in a war, and if it considers itself to be “in immediate military danger,” it is given the right to permit or prohibit the passage of any military vessels through the straits.

Thus, Turkey has the right to close the straits only in the event of an official declaration of war on it (with all the ensuing consequences), or in the event of a direct military threat.

The concept of “immediate military danger” is not disclosed by the Convention and is associated with a specific situation.

For example, according to the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, military danger is a state of interstate or intrastate relations characterized by a combination of factors that can, under certain conditions, lead to the emergence of a military threat. Thus, it is obvious that the key concept is the immediacy of the military threat: it must be clearly expressed and cannot be hypothetical.

It should also be noted that the unjustified closure of the straits, according to Article 21 of the Convention, can be revoked by the Council of the League of Nations (its functions are currently transferred to the UN) if it decides by a two-thirds majority that the measures so taken by Turkey are unjustified, and if the majority of countries that have signed the Convention agree to this.

How Türkiye “amended” the Convention with national legislation

However, the difference between the norm and the practice of its application by the Turkish authorities should also be taken into account. And with regard to the Black Sea Straits it is very ambiguous.

In the national law of Turkey itself there are many rules that complicate the use of the provisions of the Convention. For example, in 1982, Turkey decided to unilaterally extend the internal regulations of the port of Istanbul to the straits, which would give the right to close them in peacetime. She was forced to abandon this idea only under direct pressure from the USSR and other states.

In 1994, Türkiye introduced the Regulations for Navigation in the Straits - also unilaterally. This document contains many loopholes that allow Turkey to violate the navigation rights of other powers, justifying this by work carried out in the straits, police operations and other dubious circumstances. It has been repeatedly pointed out that these provisions are clearly not in accordance with the Montreux Convention, which was completely ignored by the Turkish authorities.

Thus, strictly legally, Turkey does not have the right to block Russia’s access to the straits, but in practice it may well create many problems in the implementation of this right.

The United States also ignores the norms of the Convention, systematically violating the terms of stay of its ships in the Black Sea. Thus, on February 5, 2014, in connection with the events in Crimea, the US Navy frigate Taylor entered the Black Sea, exceeding the permissible period of stay in the water area by 11 days.

The Montreux Convention and the prey turned predator

It is obvious that at present the effectiveness of a number of provisions of the Convention raises questions.

The pitfalls of the Montreux Convention were seen by the Soviet Union, which, after the end of the Great Patriotic War, sought to guarantee its security in the Black Sea - given the hostile position of Turkey, which was preparing a “stab in the back” while the USSR was fighting Nazi Germany. 28 September 2015, 16:06

The minutes of the Berlin Conference of the three Allied Powers stated: “The Straits Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as not meeting the conditions of the present time ... this matter will be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.”

Subsequently, the USSR continued to defend a tough position on the straits, putting forward demands on Turkey for exclusive control of the straits by the Black Sea powers. Claims against Turkey were lifted only after the death of Stalin, who did not have time to implement his Black Sea plans.

Western historians like to say that it was allegedly the “hostile” actions of the USSR that led to Turkey’s entry (which became a “victim of pressure”) into NATO.

However, as we see from the further development of events, the “victim” in a short time turned into a predator who felt the taste of blood.

An unprecedented aggression was carried out against Greece and Cyprus, which lost a significant part of its territory - for which Turkey did not suffer any punishment and even refused to comply with the ECHR decision on compensation for the expelled residents of Cyprus. Turkey began to forget about many of its previously assumed international obligations, claiming to restore its “imperial” status, ignoring the interests of other countries and allowing military aggression.

History clearly shows that such claims end in failure. This should also be remembered in connection with Russia’s legal right to use the straits, paid for with the blood of our soldiers. Russia has something to support the implementation of the Montreux Convention, thereby protecting its most important geopolitical interests.

And the Gallipoli Peninsula, located in the European part of Turkey. The Dardanelles Strait, whose width ranges from 1.3 km to 6 km and a length of 65 km, is of great strategic importance, as it is part of the waterway connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Black Sea.

Sea of ​​Gella

The outdated name of the strait is Hellespont, which is translated from Greek as “Sea of ​​Hell”. This name is associated with the ancient myth of twins, brother and sister, Phrixus and Hell. Born by the Orchomen king Athamas and Nephele, the children were soon left without a mother - they were raised by the evil stepmother Ino. She wanted to destroy her brother and sister, but the twins escaped on a flying ram with golden wool. During the flight, Gella slipped into the water and died. The place where the girl fell - between Chersonesos and Sigei - has since been nicknamed the “Sea of ​​Hell”. The Dardanelles Strait received its modern name from the name of the ancient city that once stood on its shore - Dardania.

Bosphorus

This is another Black Sea strait. The Bosphorus connects the Black Sea with the Sea of ​​Marmara. The strait is approximately 30 kilometers long, its width ranges from 700 m to 3700 m. The depth of the fairway is from 36 to 124 m. Istanbul (historical Constantinople) is located on both sides of the strait. The banks of the Bosphorus are connected by two bridges: the Bosphorus (length - 1074 meters) and the Sultan Mehmed Fatih Bridge (length - 1090 meters). In 2013, the Marmaray railway underwater tunnel was built to connect the Asian and European parts of Istanbul.

Geographical position

The Dardanelles Strait and the Bosphorus are located 190 kilometers apart. Between them there is an area of ​​11.5 thousand km2. A ship sailing from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean must first enter the rather narrow Bosporus, pass Istanbul, sail to the Sea of ​​Marmara, after which it will meet the Dardanelles. This strait ends which, in turn, is part of the Mediterranean. The length of this path does not exceed 170

Strategic importance

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles are links in the chain connecting the closed sea (Black) with the open sea (Mediterranean). These straits have more than once become the subject of dispute between the leading world powers. For Russia in the 19th century, the route to the Mediterranean provided access to the center of world trade and civilization. In the modern world it is also important, it is the “key” to the Black Sea. The international convention stipulates that the passage of commercial and military ships through the Black Sea straits should be free and free. However, Türkiye, which is the main regulator of traffic through the Bosphorus Strait, is trying to use this situation to its advantage. When oil exports from Russia greatly increased in 2004, Türkiye authorized restrictions on ship traffic in the Bosphorus. Traffic jams appeared in the strait, and oil workers began to suffer all sorts of losses for missed delivery deadlines and tanker downtime. Russia has officially accused Turkey of deliberately complicating traffic on the Bosphorus in order to redirect oil export traffic to the port of Ceyhan, whose services are paid. This is not Turkey's only attempt to capitalize on its geophysical position. The country has developed a project for the construction of the Bosphorus Canal. The idea is good, but the Republic of Turkey has not yet found investors to implement this project.

Fighting in the region

In antiquity, the Dardanelles belonged to the Greeks, and the main city in the region was Abydos. In 1352, the Asian shore of the strait passed to the Turks and Çanakkale became the dominant city.

According to a treaty concluded in 1841, only Turkish warships could pass through the Dardanelles. The First Balkan War put an end to this state of affairs. The Greek fleet defeated the Turkish fleet at the entrance to the straits twice: in 1912, on December 16, during the Battle of Elli, and in 1913, on January 18, in the Battle of Lemnos. After that, I did not dare to leave the strait anymore.

During the First World War, bloody battles were fought for the Dardanelles between Atlanta and Turkey. In 1915, Sir decided to knock Turkey out of the war at once, breaking through to the country's capital through the Dardanelles Strait. The First Lord of the Admiralty was deprived of military talent, so the operation failed. The campaign was poorly planned and poorly executed. In one day, the Anglo-French fleet lost three battleships, the remaining ships were seriously damaged and miraculously survived. The landing of soldiers on the Gallipoli Peninsula turned into an even greater tragedy. 150 thousand people died in a positional meat grinder that did not bring any results. After a Turkish destroyer and a German submarine sank three more British battleships, and the second landing in Suvla Bay was ingloriously defeated, it was decided to curtail the military operation. A book entitled “Dardanelles 1915. Churchill’s Bloodiest Defeat” was written about the circumstances of the greatest disaster in British military history.

The question of the straits

While the Byzantine and then the Ottoman Empire dominated the area of ​​the straits, the issue of their functioning was resolved within the states themselves. However, at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries, the situation changed - Russia reached the coast of the Black and Azov Seas. The problem of control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles has risen on the international agenda.

In 1841, at a conference in London, an agreement was reached that the straits would be closed to the passage of warships in peacetime. Since 1936, according to modern international law, the Straits area has been considered the “high seas” and issues regarding it are regulated by the Montreux Convention relating to the Status of the Straits. Thus, control over the straits is carried out while maintaining Turkish sovereignty.

Provisions of the Montreux Convention

The convention states that merchant ships of any state have free access to passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles both in war and in peacetime. The Black Sea powers can conduct military vessels of any class through the straits. Non-Black Sea states can only allow small surface ships to pass through the Dardanelles and Bosporus.

If Türkiye is involved in hostilities, the country can, at its discretion, allow warships of any power through. During a war in which the Republic of Turkey has no connection, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus must be closed to military courts.

The last conflict in which the mechanisms provided for by the Convention were involved was the South Ossetian crisis in August 2008. At this time, US Navy warships were passed through the straits and proceeded towards the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi.

Conclusion

The Dardanelles Strait occupies very little space on the map of Eurasia. However, the strategic importance of this transport corridor on the continent cannot be overestimated. From an economic point of view, what is important for Russia is, first of all, the export of petroleum products. Transporting “black gold” by water is much cheaper than by oil pipeline. Every day, 136 ships pass through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, 27 of them are tankers. The density of traffic through the Black Sea straits is four times higher than the intensity of the Panama Canal, and three times higher than the Suez Canal. Due to the low passability of the straits, the Russian Federation suffers daily losses of approximately $12.3 million. However, a worthy alternative has not yet been found.